Gender, Remittances and Development

Preliminary Findings From Selected SADC Countries
Gender, Migration and Remittances in Selected SADC Countries: Preliminary Findings

Lead author: Tim Hughes, South African Institute of International Affairs
Contributing author: Ayesha Kajee (SAIIA)
Contributing author and reviewer: Sally Peberdy

United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW)
César Nicolás Penson 102-A
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
Tel: 1-809-685-2111
Fax: 1-809-685-2117
Email: info@un-instraw.org
Webpage: http://www.un-instraw.org

South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)
PO Box 31596
Braamfontein 2017
South Africa
Tel: +27 11 339-2021
Fax: +27 11 339-2154
E-mail: info@saiia.org.za

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List of Abbreviations

AU   African Union
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act
HIPC  Highly-indebted poor countries
IMTS  Informal money transfer systems
IOM  International Organisation for Migration
PRSPs Poverty-reduction strategy papers
SADC Southern African Development Community
SAFPD South African Forum for Population and Development
SAIIA South African Institute of International Affairs
SAMP Southern African Migration Project
SAMCPD Southern African Minister’s Conference on Population and Development
SME  Small- and medium-enterprise
TEBA The Employment Bureau of South Africa
UN-INSTRAW United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women
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In recent years, there has been a clear increase in interest and discussion of the role of migration in the development of communities and countries of origin. The flow of remittances send by male and female migrants is considered a key factor that, when adequately utilized, can have a significant positive impact on development. This interest in the effects of migration and remittances coincides with various phenomena that make a gendered analysis of the migration-development linkage indispensable. The overall increase in international migration has included a parallel process of feminization of migratory flows, and the growing importance of remittances demands an analysis of the differential patterns of sending and utilization of remittances by women and men.

Within this framework, the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW) established the Gender, Migration and Development research programme, which aims to better understand the gender dimensions of migratory processes and the migration-development nexus, with remittances as a key component of this nexus. An analysis of migration that places gender inequalities (in access to and utilization of productive resources, in the distribution of work, in family and community roles, etc.) at its core is essential to an accurate understanding of these processes, as well as the formulation of appropriate policies and strategies that promote a positive impact of migration and remittances on development. The main objective of UN-INSTRAW’s work is to contribute to the formulation of public policies that promote gender-sensitive development. In this context, UN-INSTRAW partnered with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) to carry out the present study.

Addressing these issues with the context of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was of particular interest for various reasons. First, current research on migration and remittances tends to focus on the analysis of population movements from countries in the Global South to countries in the Global North. As a result, there is a significant imbalance between the attention paid to South-North migration and its relative importance in the overall volume of migration. Thus, it is especially important to turn our efforts and resources to understanding South-South migratory processes such as those examined in the current study. The context of SADC is remarkable for its diversity. The countries of the region exhibit varying socio-economic and political conditions, and the region itself has a tradition of intra-regional mobility that is characterized by many different types of movement (from cross-border vendors to the migration of qualified health personnel, to refugee populations and contract migration to mines or agriculture). This diversity of contexts allows for a multifaceted analysis of the factors that shape the different types of migration (permanent, temporary, circular, forced, etc.) and their impact on development processes in the countries of origin. Moreover, the context of Southern Africa obliges us to break with traditionally narrow and economistic notions that conceive of development as the mere increase of per capita income. It is, for example, essential to understand the interrelation between migration, HIV/AIDS and remittances. A focus on this broader context also obliges us to introduce other elements into the analysis that enrich our understanding of the migration-development linkage and allow us to understand the diverse manifestations of this link in different spaces and times.

Though intra-regional migration in Southern Africa has always been complex, this complexity has grown as a result of more recent changes in migratory patterns. As the mining industry – which was a traditional destination of male migration - has declined, migratory strategies have been redefined, other points of insertion into the labour force have been identified (construction, the service sector), and other sources of income created (cross-border trade, the informal sector). This sectoral change coincides with a feminization of intra-regional migration in SADC. Though women have always been part of these population flows, they have historically been very male-dominated. Lately however, the presence of women is becoming more significant. Data are hard to obtain and are often incomplete, but it is estimated that overall, women represent 47% of all migrants in the region.
These combined factors make SADC a particularly interesting case study. Though there is no scarcity of research on migration in SADC, existing research is highly weighted towards understanding male migration to the mining and agricultural sectors in South Africa, which has left significant gaps in information and analysis. Some of these gaps are the focus of the present study.

Within the region, analysis has also traditionally focused on migration towards South Africa from other SADC countries. Though South Africa certainly receives the most migrants, intra-regional population movement is much more complex, as this study attempts to show. As mentioned, analysis has also tended to focus on labour migration to the mining and agricultural sectors, although migration in recent years has increasingly been motivated by other reasons, as well as other forms of labour. Finally, the present study looks at the significant dearth of data on female migration in SADC. A significant proportion of existing data is not disaggregated by sex, and the overwhelming focus on male migration has rendered women’s presence and role in migratory flows all but invisible. In any case, analyses in the region have largely lacked a gender perspective that would generate an understanding of the influence of such factors as the unequal distribution of resources between men and women, sex-segregated labour markets, the gendered division of labour and gender roles in households and communities. In addition to these gaps in information and analysis on migratory flows, the information available on remittances flows is scarce and very scattered, and few studies have examined their impact in terms of development.

The incipient state of gender-based analyses of the impact of migration and remittances on development in SADC meant that the first priority of the collaboration between UN-INSTRRAW and SAIIA was a review and analysis of existing literature. This review has allowed us to identify existing research gaps that will guide the preparation of proposals for future applied research projects. Thus, the present study begins with an analysis of available information – disaggregated by sex where possible – and concludes with the identification of research priorities that would contribute to the formulation of more appropriate public policy in terms of migration, remittances and development.

In addition to the literature review, the current study presents information gathered at a focus group meeting that brought together researchers, policy-makers and other key actors (27 February 2007, Johannesburg) to exchange experiences and information and to reflect on the main topics of the study. Finally, the study also presents the conclusions of an inter-agency meeting (30 May 2007, Johannesburg) that brought together political officials, representatives of international organizations such as the ILO and the Red Cross, leading researchers on migrancy, representatives of NGOs and female migrants. In order to complement the institutional and academic components of the study with more concrete information, some preliminary interviews were also conducted with female migrants in South Africa.

This study offers a general overview: firstly, of migration in SADC (migratory patterns, strategies and reasons behind migration and the different types of flows); secondly, of remittances flows (values, transfer mechanisms, monetary or goods remittances, frequency and quantities, particular flows such as from mining workers, impacts on recipient households and their role at the national and regional levels); thirdly, of the African (migration policies), SADC (migration and gender policies), and national (migration, citizenship and refugee policies) political contexts; and fourthly, of the links between HIV/AIDS, migratory flows and remittances.

On the basis of this synthesis and analysis of information, the research gaps identified are oriented towards supporting the formulation and implementation of policies that promote a positive impact of migration and remittances on development from a gender perspective. Finally, a series of annexes presents specific information on South Africa (as the main destination country for intra-regional migration), the results of the focus group and the guide and notes from interviews conducted with female migrants in South Africa. These are the main objectives of the present study, the
reasons behind the selection of SADC as the focus of the study and the methodology utilized. UN-INSTRAW and SAIIA hope to contribute with this study to the formulation of strategies and policies that allow for positive synergies between migration and development, taking into account the central, but not unique, role of remittances and considering that an accurate understanding of gender dimensions will contribute to more effective and sustainable policies and respond to a conceptualization of development that has equality between men and women as one of its fundamental objectives.
"If their families are in need they must stand up, and they must do something...Gone are the days when you would just sit and expect men to feed you, you have got to do it for yourself sometimes" (woman migrant, South Africa, 2007).  

More than 16 million Africans, and an increasing number of African women, are migrants. Another 13 million Africans are internally displaced people. Africans account for one fifth of global migrants and by 2025 one in ten Africans will live and work outside their country of origin. Adding to the complexity of the causes and drivers of migration on the continent, one in four African countries are afflicted by armed conflict and many more suffer from a deteriorating environmental, climatic and natural resources base. The rate of urbanization in Africa stands at 3.5% per annum which is the highest globally. By 2030, 54% of the African population will be urbanized, up from 38% today. Africa also suffers from patchy and uneven migration policy continentally, regionally and indeed nationally. More particularly, migration policy with respect to women in Africa is almost entirely absent, or generally gender-blind, but not necessarily gender-neutral in its effect.

Among the effects of globalization has been the opening of labour markets for certain (usually skilled) workers. Its impacts are also felt within the SADC but the biggest effect is the loss of skills from the continent. Presently out-migration from the region to other parts of the world is of considerable concern to governments in the region and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as it largely comprises skilled migrants – particularly medical professionals including doctors and nurses, engineers, IT workers and teachers, some taking advantages offered by globalization.

This review can be located within the broad framework of structural factors giving rise to new and emerging migration patterns. Robin Cohen notes six global trends in international migration patterns that are relevant to post-apartheid South Africa:

- Refugee migration
- Migration shopping
- Undocumented workers
- Skilled transients
- Unskilled contract workers
- Independent female migrants

Although women are part of the first five trends outlined by Cohen, by identifying ‘independent female migrants’ as a separate trend he emphasizes how migration streams are increasingly being populated by women who are making their own decisions regarding migration, may be migrating alone and are increasingly likely to be skilled. However, his identification of ‘independent female’ migration as a separate category can be seen as problematic and a-historical as it implies women are not part of the other trends he identifies and ignores a long history of “independent” women’s migration.

On a continental level, Adepoju (2006) argues that Sub-Saharan African migration is, in part, propelled by fragile ecosystems and cyclical drought patterns so inland rural communities are increasingly drawn to coastal regions. He contends that African migration patterns, or at least mobility, are increasingly characterized by entrepreneurial movement of cross-border traders and street vendors and less by labour migration. Certainly in southern Africa traffic through border posts is dominated by traders.  

Traffic and trade routes in Africa are growing, thus facilitating greater mobility to areas of economic opportunity. War and conflict on the continent contribute to refugee flows and internal displacement. Notably too, for Adepoju, replacement migration is a characteristic of recent continental patterns as expatriate professionals from outside the continent replace skills lost to Africa. Adepoju does not provide a gendered analysis of migration on the continent nor does he examine patterns of female migration.

Migration has been a significant part of the history of southern Africa dating back to before the arrival of the first Europeans on its shores. While in-country rural-urban migration comprises the majority of movement in the region over the past 100-150 years, cross-border

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1. Cited in Kate Lefko-Everett, ‘Voices from the margins: Recounting women’s migration experiences in southern Africa,’ SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 46, 2007.
2. The SADC comprises fourteen countries: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
migration, the focus of this paper, also constitutes a significant part of regional migration. The development of settler, colonial and apartheid economies in the region entrenched labour markets that stretch across the region and economic sectors. Patterns of cross-border labour migration have centred on the mining, commercial agriculture and service sectors.

Colonial borders cut through many communities, separating clans and families and increasing local border movement. Free movement was allowed between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland until 1963 (although migrants were subject to South African internal racial restrictions on movement and settlement). As South Africa annexed Namibia (then South West Africa) following World War II and administered it until independence in 1990, free movement (at least for white people) was allowed until then. Secret

Table 1 - Types of migration in the SADC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visa status</th>
<th>Permanent migration (immigration/emigration)</th>
<th>Temporary migration</th>
<th>Contract migration</th>
<th>Localized mobility</th>
<th>Asylum-seekers &amp; refugees</th>
<th>Irregular migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visa status</strong></td>
<td>Permanent residence permit</td>
<td>Permits issued for a specific purpose for a specific period of time (may be renewable)</td>
<td>Work permits issued under bi-lateral agreements &amp; localized agreements</td>
<td>Border passes which allow movement within a specified distance from the border</td>
<td>Asylum-seekers permits &amp; refugee permits</td>
<td>None, or overstayed permit/visa, or break the terms of the permit/visa issued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of movement</strong></td>
<td>Intention to remain permanently in another country. Usually only available to skilled migrants</td>
<td>Intention usually to remain for a specified period of time. Usually only available to skilled migrants</td>
<td>Intention to work for a specific industry for a specific period of time. Available to unskilled workers</td>
<td>For people living in a specified distance from borders</td>
<td>People fleeing persecution, war and public disorder in their home countries</td>
<td>Usually circular migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reasons</strong></td>
<td>Reasons for issuing permit include: Work, business, marriage, long term temporary residence, retirement</td>
<td>Reasons for issuing permit include: Work (often circular migration); visits (tourists, small scale/informal cross-border traders, visiting family &amp; friends); study; business; medical</td>
<td>Reasons for issuing permit: To work in mining sector or commercial farms. Circular (mines) or seasonal (agriculture) migration</td>
<td>Recognition that colonial boundaries divide communities and that economies straddle borders</td>
<td>As above based on 1951 UN &amp; 1967 OAU Conventions on refugees</td>
<td>For work and self-employment in the informal sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family</strong></td>
<td>Immediate family members usually able to obtain permits</td>
<td>Issued individually</td>
<td>Issued individually family members excluded</td>
<td>Issued individually</td>
<td>Issued individually with provisions for family reunification</td>
<td>Likely to migrate as individuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
side deals allowed what was called ‘clandestine’ migration from Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique) until at least the late 1960s.4

Intra-regional labour migration encompasses temporary migration, including contract workers and seasonal migrants; permanent migration or immigration; and forced or refugee migration (see table below). Circular migration remains a noteworthy component of cross-border movement. Thus many migrants travel alone and have two homes, one in their home country and one at their destination. Hence, the term migrancy is often used in the region to capture the high rates of mobility and movement. It reflects the fact that for many migrants in Southern Africa, migration is more than a single journey – it includes many journeys back and forth between their country of origin and destination country on an annual or even monthly basis.5

Patterns of intra-regional migration in SADC have also been shaped by war and apartheid which has led to relatively large refugee movements within the region. In the past, refugees have arrived from Angola and Mozambique and more recently from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi to neighbouring states, and sometimes further-a-field in the region. Asylum-seekers from other parts of Africa and the rest of the world can also be found in SADC.

Movement for trade and business add to the complexity of mobility in the region. Small scale, or informal sector cross-border traders, while often not strictly migrants as they travel for short periods (sometimes just a day) to shop and are highly mobile comprise a significant component of cross-border traffic. Reflecting high levels of participation in the informal sector in the region, a considerable proportion of these traders are women.

Historically, movement into southern Africa from outside the continent has also included Europeans who arrived as colonists and settlers, Indians who came as indentured labourers, traders, professionals and workers, Chinese indentured labourers and independent migrants and to South Africa, slaves from south-east Asia. In-migration from China, Europe and India continues today.

War and conflicts in the Great Lakes, Angola, Mozambique and the DRC have produced flows of forced and other migrants. However, recent years have seen the end of the Angolan civil war, relative peace in Burundi and Rwanda, and the cessation of civil war in most of the DRC (although bloody fighting is still going on in eastern DRC). The economic collapse of Zimbabwe in the mid-2000s has led to significant out-migration to other countries in the region as well as overseas, although as much of SADC migration is irregular, actual numbers are hard to estimate.6

There is a considerable body of scholarly work, research and policy analysis of migration in the SADC region, but the bulk of the work on intra-regional migration has South Africa, or migration to South Africa as its focus. Crush contends that migration in SADC, and South Africa in particular, is one of the most intensively and extensively locally-researched areas of the social sciences. However this research has focused on migration to South Africa and particularly in the area of cross-border migration, centred on male migration to the mining sector, and to a lesser extent historically, the commercial agricultural sector.

Recent work, although sometimes more gender-sensitive, has retained its focus on intra-regional migration to South Africa. It has centred on policy issues; xenophobia, integration and attitudes to migrants and migration; the participation of migrants in various sectors of the economy (including construction, mining, commercial agriculture, domestic work, informal/small-medium-enterprise (SME) activity); skilled or ‘brain drain’ migration; the relationships between HIV/AIDS and migration; and small scale cross-border trade.

5. The concept of migrancy, which was initially used within the Southern African context, at present, is profusely used in postmodern and cultural studies and in the literature on transnationalism. According to DeMaria Harney and Baldassar (2007) it involves three key shifts of focus: (1) privileging movement in space and time between “sending” and “receiving” communities instead of understanding migration as a rather one-way movement; (2) decentering the nation and focusing on migrants’ agency; and (3) focusing on power inequalities, not just those displayed by states, but more subtle forms of power such as discourses, the construction of subjectivities, etc. Nicolas DeMaria Harney and Loretta Baldassar, ‘Tracking Transnationalism: Migrancy and its Futures’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 33 No 2, March 2007.
6. Some estimates place the number of Zimbabweans living outside the country at 3 million, however the origin of this figure is unknown and it is untested, and probably an over-estimate given that the total Zimbabwean population at the last census was 12 million.
This paper is located against the backdrop of changes in migratory flows in SADC in recent years. The democratization of South Africa and the removal of the apartheid regime in 1994 opened up the country to legal migration for black people (although it had ostensibly been opened in 1986). At the same time, asylum-seekers could take refuge in South Africa for the first time. Between 1996 and 2007 there has been a significant reduction in employment in the gold mines and the foreign workforce (mainly from Lesotho) has fallen by over 50%. There has been a visible increase in migration to South Africa from African countries outside the SADC, as well as China and India. Settlements of the civil wars of Mozambique (in the early 1990s) and Angola (in the early 2000s) stopped refugee flows from these countries and many have returned home under refugee repatriation schemes. Refugees continue to flee the Democratic Republic of the Congo as fighting persists in the east of the country.

In the mid-2000s, land reform and economic crisis in Zimbabwe have significantly changed migration flows. Land reform led to significant numbers of Mozambican and Malawian migrant farm workers losing their jobs. As the economic crisis has worsened, increasing numbers of Zimbabweans are also leaving the country, to other SADC countries (particularly South Africa, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique), Europe and the United States. The number of Zimbabweans now living outside the country is unknown, although some estimates are as high as 3 million.

This paper focuses on cross-border migration to and from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland. However, migration patterns in the region are complex, encompassing most SADC countries. At the same time, information regarding gender, women, migration, and remittances is uneven and often non-existent. It is difficult to confine a discussion of migration in Southern Africa to the initially-selected focus countries, so, reference is also made to other SADC countries where relevant, including Angola, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Methodological note

The two UN-INSTRAW research publications Gender, Remittances and Development: The case of women migrants from Vincent Noble, Dominican Republic (2006), as well as the attendant methodological guide, The Development Potential of Remittances: A gender perspective (Qualitative Research Methodology) (2006), informed the conceptualization of this report.

The main objective of the UN-INSTRAW project is to:

Contribute to efforts aimed at harnessing the potential of remittances in developing countries by mainstreaming the gender perspective into the study of remittance flows and their use and socio-economic impact among remittance-recipient households and communities.

The specific objectives of UN-INSTRAW’s research programme are two-fold:

1. To better understand the gender dimensions present in remittance flows and their impact on gender roles within remittance-recipient households and communities.
2. To provide key stakeholders – migrant associations, NGOs, academia, international assistance agencies, United Nations agencies and financial institutions – with the tools to enhance the gender perspective in programmes that draw connections between remittances and development.

The UN-INSTRAW study on gender, remittances and development in Vicente Noble, Dominican Republic not only provides a detailed synthesis of one case, it also informed the theoretical context of the research for this SADC study. Moreover the Vincente Noble case study provided a textured synthesis of contemporary literature on gender, migration, remittances and development. Significantly, the Vincent Noble study drew on a wide array of secondary sources as no single report; book or study adequately explains the complex dynamic and interplay between gender, migration, remittances and development. Indeed, the Vincente Noble study is at
the forefront of research in the field and thus served as a unique template for this SADC study. However, the Vincente Noble case study centred on female migration to Spain in particular, whereas this SADC study focuses on female migration from six SADC countries - Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe - to South Africa. Moreover, early on in the SADC research it became clear that whilst traditional migration patterns in the region date back over a century, they are nevertheless highly evolving, disparate and complex, particularly with regard to the period and frequency of migration, but in particular with regard to the increasing feminization of migration in the region. Thus, whilst the Vincente Noble study provided a unique analytical, theoretical, conceptual and comparative starting point for the SADC study, the differences between the two cases are significant and should be borne in mind.

The UN-INSTRAW qualitative research methodology on gender, remittances and development was analyzed and work-shopped in some detail and provided a useful guideline to the conceptualization of interviews conducted during the course of this SADC study, as well as the particular sequencing and structuring of the questions and questionnaire.

The second phase of this report entailed sourcing and compiling a literature survey of the field. As there is no single study that deals with gender, migration, remittances and development in SADC, thematic searches were conducted in the broader disciplines of SADC policy studies, SADC gender studies, SADC migration studies, SADC remittances and SADC development studies. Some ninety relevant publications and reports were compiled. However, none of them specifically covered the spectrum of research required for this study. This in itself demonstrated a significant research gap and highlighted the need for and uniqueness of this particular study.

The third phase of the research entailed the organization of an expert focus group of researchers, policy-makers and practitioners in the fields of gender, migration, remittances and development in SADC in order to analyze and discuss these issues and provide inputs to the methodological, theoretical and practical dimensions of this study (see the Focus Group Report in Annex 2). This focus group consisted of academics from SADC universities, policy analysts from the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP), agencies such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the World Bank, representatives from financial and remittance agencies, SADC diplomats, South African government representatives and NGOs.

The fourth phase of the study involved interviewing (mostly) female migrants from the SADC region in South Africa (see the Interview Guide and Notes in Annex 3). Whereas the UN-INSTRAW research methodology document provided a useful framework for the conceptualization of the questions and questionnaire, the SADC interviews were more introductory in nature and thus questions were framed to elicit general patterns whilst providing the space for interviewees to discuss and develop their particular histories and experiences. A number of factors made this phase of the research particularly challenging, including locating and winning the trust of female migrants in South Africa. Given the un-documented nature of many female migrants to South Africa, the often problematic behaviour of the Department of Home Affairs and the South African Police Service, combined with widespread xenophobia, the problem of finding female migrants that were willing to be interviewed was a significant methodological challenge.

The fifth phase of the research convened an inter-agency meeting (May 31st 2007) at which the provisional findings of the project were discussed and inputs provided on the gaps in the research, as well as possible methodological and practical steps forward. The inter-agency meeting drew together members of the South African parliament, representatives from the South African local government, the Department of Home Affairs, representatives from the United Nations system, local, regional and international academics, NGOs involved in female migration and rights issues, as well as female migrants themselves.
The sixth and final phase of the research saw the desk top survey being distributed for peer review, critique and comment by UN-INSTRAW and other researchers. Extensive commentary and input was made and the final report reflects the consolidation of a wide variety of perspectives.

2.1. Context of migration and remittances in SADC

Household formation, education and unemployment levels are likely to affect migration and remittance patterns. While the structure of households, education and unemployment levels are often influenced by gender roles and relations and discrimination in any given society, these roles and relations are themselves reflected in migration and remittance patterns. At the same time gender exercises significant influence on decision-making about household livelihood strategies, opportunities for migration and income-generation, and therefore the volume of remittances and the ways they can be utilized.

There is no significant information available on changes in household formation in the region over recent years. However, it is inevitable that HIV/AIDS has dramatically affected and will continue to affect the way households are structured. In particular, increased dependency ratios for households that are supporting orphans of family members who have died of AIDS are particularly likely. There has also been an increase in the number of child-headed households across the region and grandparents (usually grandmothers) are increasingly taking on the role of parent to their grandchildren. However it is unclear how these changes have, or are likely to, affect migration patterns and remittance behaviour.

A significant proportion of households in SADC are headed by women (see Table 2). Figures are particularly high in Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland, where the percentage of households headed by women recorded in censuses and household surveys is over 40%, and in Botswana nearly 50%. Census data from South Africa shows an increase in female-headed households between 1996 and 1997 and that black African households are more likely to be headed by women than those of other groups. This may in part reflect high rates of internal migration in South Africa. SAMP research with remittance recipient households found relatively significant proportions of female headship, though lower than those identified by the UN Statistics Division.

It is not clear why this should be, but could be in part because the definition and identification of the sex of heads of households can be problematic as a result of the clash between traditional gender stereotypes and evolving gender roles. In southern Africa, where internal and cross-border migration comprise a significant part of household livelihood strategies it is even more difficult as households may be spread over two locations, each with a different head, although part of the same, but geographically separated, household. It could also

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Women as household heads (%)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Women as household heads (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>South Africa (2001)*</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Swaziland (1986)</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius (1990)</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>Zimbabwe (1992)</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The comparable figure in the 1996 census was 37.8%. The proportion of black African households headed by women was 46.6% in 2001 as compared to 43.3% in 1996.

11. Wade Pendleton et al., 'Migration and remittances.' The study found 22% of surveyed households in Botswana; 19% in Lesotho; 18% in Mozambique; 17% in Swaziland and 22% in Zimbabwe were headed by women.
be because some female-headed households may lack the resources to enable them to become migrants.

No comprehensive data on average household size was found in the region, and the structure of households varies within countries ranging from traditional extended families to nuclear families with a range of other formations in-between. Although African households are often perceived as large and extended, available data do not indicate that this is so in SADC. The SAMP survey on migrant remittances found the average number of people per household dependent on migrant remittances was 6.3. However, a survey of access to banking found the average household size in Botswana in rural areas was 5 and in urban areas 4. In Lesotho the figures were 5.5 in rural and 4.6 in urban areas; in Namibia 5.9 in rural and 5.1 in urban areas; and in Swaziland 6.7 in rural and 4.3 in urban areas.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Women (%)</th>
<th>Men (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola (2001)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana (2003)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC (2001)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho (2001)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar (2000)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi (1998)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius (2000)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia (2001)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (2001)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland (2000)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania (2002)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia (1999)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences in levels of education between men and women vary across the region. In two countries, Botswana and Lesotho, women are more likely to be literate than men (see Table 3). In Lesotho the differences are particularly stark as 90% of women aged over 15 are literate as compared to only 75% of men. This reflects different schooling and employment opportunities for Basotho boys and girls and women and men. Boys in rural areas are responsible for taking cattle into the mountains to graze and miss school as a result. At the same time, until recently there was always the possibility for boys of migrating to the South African mines where literacy is not always a requirement for employment. However, in some other countries (e.g., Angola, the DRC and Malawi) women are far less likely than men to be literate, which may reduce their possibilities for migrating.

Many SADC countries are debilitated by heavy debt burdens despite debt relief for highly-indebted poor countries (HIPC) and the prospect of the realization of the commitments made at the G8 Gleneagles Summit in 2005. In SADC, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi & Mozambique have all undergone structural adjustment programmes which whilst delivering episodic benefits, also resulted in the shedding of thousands of jobs in the state sector, many of them teachers, nurses and other care-giving professionals. These are professions which are strongly associated with the employment of women and so women are likely to have been most affected. At the same, structural adjustment and other economic restructuring policies have led to increases in fees for health care and education, escalating both the need for cash income and spending on household consumption.

Reported rates of economic activity are difficult to determine while estimations of unemployment are problematic as definitions vary between and even within countries. However, rates of unemployment in most SADC countries are high, and women are less likely to be economically active and more likely to be unemployed.15 Nor do unemployment rates account for under-employment, low rates of pay and rural households existing on low cash incomes. In Zimbabwe, unemployment is currently estimated to be as high as 80%. In Mozambique unemployment is at 50%, in Lesotho 36%, in Namibia 25-30% and in South Africa estimates range from 25-35%. In addition to these challenging domestic economic conditions in many SADC countries, the relatively higher wages and stronger currencies of South Africa, Botswana and Namibia may attract migrants.

14. UN Statistics Division.
15. UN Statistics Division.
3. MIGRANCY IN THE SADC

3.1. Migration Patterns and Flows

3.1.1. Foreign-born populations

As noted above, labour migration in SADC has a long history. A 2006 SAMP survey of over 4,700 migrant-sending households found that current migrants are often following a family tradition of migrancy. As Table 4 shows, significant proportions of their parents and grandparents had also gone to another country for work. This was particularly true of migrants from Lesotho and Mozambique, no doubt reflecting century-old migration flows from these countries to South Africa’s mines and farms.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Parent</th>
<th>Grandparent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>N=606</td>
<td>N=571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>N=1086</td>
<td>N=1019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>N=918</td>
<td>N=902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>N=1098</td>
<td>N=1098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>N=403</td>
<td>N=329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N=4111</td>
<td>N=3919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although South Africa is seen as the hub of intra-regional, and even extra-regional migration in SADC, as the Tables 5 and 6 show, flows of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers are more complex than a one-directional flow to South Africa. While they only have relatively small populations, the proportions of foreign-born persons recorded in Namibia (2 million total population), Botswana (1.6m), Swaziland (1.1m), and Zimbabwe (12.2m) are all higher than in South Africa (44.2m). However, South Africa is home to the greatest number of foreign-born people and probably the largest number of irregular migrants who do not appear in Table 5. This shows that although countries are often characterized as ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ countries, the picture is more complex as countries are usually both. Similarly, UNHCR data on refugees and asylum-seekers indicate that some refugee-producing countries (e.g., Angola and particularly the DRC) may also host refugees and asylum-seekers.

Unfortunately at the time of writing, sex-disaggregated data by country are not available on types of migration, i.e., permanent migration/immigration, work/employment permits or contract workers. However, it should be noted that South Africa, recognizing the racially exclusionary immigration policies of the apartheid years, introduced three amnesties which enabled approximately 50,000 mineworkers, 129,000 SADC nationals and 200,000 Mozambicans to obtain permanent residence.

Table 5 - Foreign-born by country and sex ratio of the foreign-born population (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Foreign-born (#)</th>
<th>Foreign-born as % of population</th>
<th>Sex ratio of foreign-born (women/100 men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>539,000</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar*</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>279,000</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique**</td>
<td>406,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>143,000</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa***</td>
<td>1,106,000</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>792,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>511,000</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*By citizenship not place of birth
** This may include Mozambicans born outside the country during the war who have returned.
*** South African Census 2001 shows that women comprised 39.9% of the foreign-born population and 37.4% of those born in other SADC countries.

Overall, women are estimated to comprise 47% of migrants in the region. Although no time-series data is currently available, it is believed that migration streams are increasingly feminized. However, the table above indicates that patterns of male and female migration

17. Wade Pendleton et al., ‘Migration and remittances..’
19. UN Statistics Division. Sources are based on official statistics and therefore exclude irregular migrants.
are complex and differentiated across the region. In some SADC countries, foreign-born women outnumber foreign-born men. For Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia this may reflect available employment opportunities in commercial agriculture. Tea and coffee are significant crops in Malawi and Tanzania, and women are preferred as pickers. The imbalance between foreign-born women and men in Mauritius (172 women/100 men), reflects contract migration to the textile sector. The relatively high foreign-born population for the small, poor country of Malawi, and the predominance of foreign-born women may also have been a result of the past. During the 1980s Malawi was home to around 3 million Mozambican refugees, most of whom were repatriated at the end of the civil war. Mauritius has been actively developing its textile industry to take advantage of opportunities under (AGOA) and has been importing skilled contract machinists from India who are predominantly women.

South African data indicate that the region of origin of the migrant also affects the balance between foreign-born men and women. Census 2001 found that only 37.4% of migrants born in other SADC countries were women and only 33.8% of those born in the rest of Africa were women. On the other hand, 49.3% of migrants born in European countries, 42.1% of those born in Asia and 50.2% of those born elsewhere were women. South Africa, women comprise over 44% of asylum-seekers. This may be because for these countries most refugees have arrived from conflict areas close to the national borders separating refugee-producing and receiving countries, therefore female refugees have less far to travel. Refugees arriving in Botswana and South Africa have had to travel through third countries, and may even arrive by air. Thus greater resources are needed and these are more likely to be held by men, or at least invested in men who could be seen to have greater earning potential.

South African data indicate that the region of origin of the migrant also affects the balance between foreign-born men and women. Census 2001 found that only 37.4% of migrants born in other SADC countries were women and only 33.8% of those born in the rest of Africa were women. On the other hand, 49.3% of migrants born in European countries, 42.1% of those born in Asia and 50.2% of those born elsewhere were women. South African data indicate that the region of origin of the migrant also affects the balance between foreign-born men and women. Census 2001 found that only 37.4% of migrants born in other SADC countries were women and only 33.8% of those born in the rest of Africa were women. On the other hand, 49.3% of migrants born in European countries, 42.1% of those born in Asia and 50.2% of those born elsewhere were women.20 SAMP research suggests that there are also country differences in migration to South Africa, so Zimbabwean migrants are more likely to be women than those from other SADC countries.

### 3.1.2. Asylum-seekers and refugees

UNHCR data on asylum-seekers and refugees in SADC countries also show variations in the flows of forced migrants and differences in the balances between men and women among asylum-seeking populations of different countries. Although it is generally held that women, because of their lower income-earning possibilities as well as family responsibilities are more likely to be internally displaced than men, UNHCR data suggest that this does not always hold true in SADC countries where, with the exception of Botswana and South Africa, women comprise over 44% of asylum-seekers. This may be because for these countries most refugees have arrived from conflict areas close to the national borders separating refugee-producing and receiving countries, therefore female refugees have less far to travel. Refugees arriving in Botswana and South Africa have had to travel through third countries, and may even arrive by air. Thus greater resources are needed and these are more likely to be held by men, or at least invested in men who could be seen to have greater earning potential.21

#### Table 6 - Refugees and asylum-seekers (2005)22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Asylum seekers</th>
<th>Female pop. of concern to UNHCR (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>13,984</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>3,109</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>204,341</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>4,240</td>
<td>5,331</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,954</td>
<td>4,015</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>5,307</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa*</td>
<td>29,714</td>
<td>140,095</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>548,824</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>155,718</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>13,880</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The high number of asylum-seekers compared to refugees in South Africa reflects the inefficiency of the asylum determination process.

#### 3.1.3. Irregular migration

Although unquantified and unquantifiable, irregular migration is a significant feature of regional migration for a number of reasons. First, immigration legislation excludes unskilled and semi-skilled workers, except for contract workers for the mining and agricultural sectors. Second, travel documents and visas (where required) can be expensive and hard to get. Third, for most

countries land borders are long and difficult to police and border posts can be far apart. So even if someone has documents it may be cheaper and quicker to cross the border without passing through a border post, since crossing without documents may be relatively easy. Parts of some borders (e.g., Botswana/Zimbabwe, South Africa/Mozambique/Zimbabwe) are protected by electric fences. Some migrants use smugglers to help them cross the border and there are reports of abuse by smugglers and thieves who prey on smugglers and those being smuggled. This includes sexual abuse of women.23 Officials may solicit sexual favours from female irregular migrants instead of arresting them. Little is known about the gender dynamics of irregular migration, but it is thought that men dominate these migration flows.

3.1.4. Circular migration

Migration in SADC can largely be characterized as circular. Many if not most migrants maintain two homes, one in their destination country and one in the country of origin. Families of migrants usually remain in the country or origin. Some return home frequently. Circular migration, besides being a traditional form of migration in the region, also reflects ties to land and housing in home countries. SAMP research shows that SADC migrants consistently say that access to land and housing is better in their home countries. A 2006 study found 30% of migrants returned home every month, 13% on a quarterly basis, and only 19% annually.24 Census 2001 data from South Africa seems to reflect the circular nature of migration in SADC, but may be most pronounced in South Africa owing to its apartheid history.25 It found that in Gauteng, the province with the most cross-border migrants, over a third of households of people born in SADC countries were one-person households, while 22.9% were contained only two people, 15.7% three people and only 12.6% four people. Census 2001 also shows significantly different age profiles for migrant populations in Gauteng. Some 31% of the non-migrant South African population is 14 years or younger and 66% aged between 15 and 65 years. However less than 6% of the SADC born population of Gauteng was aged between 0-14 years and over 90% were aged between 15 and 65 years.

3.2. Migration strategies and reasons for migrating

As noted above, cross-border migration has been a livelihood strategy for households in SADC for over a hundred years. Gendered analysis of migration patterns, strategies and reasons for migrating is limited in the region. However, analysis of SAMP studies conducted across the countries of Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe in 1997 reveals some patterns.26 The validity of these patterns has been reinforced by subsequent research on migration and remittances, which also included Botswana and Swaziland.27 This research suggests that although the number of women migrants in South Africa has increased, with the exception of Zimbabwe, temporary migration in SADC to South Africa is still male-dominated. The research shows that female migrants are more likely to be married and older than their male counterparts, as well as being better educated. It seems that lack of education inhibits women from migrating. This may be due to different employment opportunities available to unskilled and less educated men and women.

Men from these SADC countries are more likely to migrate in search of employment opportunities, while women migrate for a wider range of social and economic factors. Unlike men, employment is not the overwhelming reason for the movement of women, who move for multiple reasons including visits, trade, shopping and self-employment, as well as employment. Women are more likely to migrate to visit family and friends, to trade and shop (usually for informal businesses at home), be self-employed in the informal sector, as well as to seek employment. The survey, because of where samples were taken did not fully identify the extent of female labour migration to commercial farms in border areas.28 Where men and women migrate is influenced by their reason for migrating and where employment

23. SAWIMA, ‘If your neighbour’s house is burning and you don’t assist to put out the fire your house will burn too,’ unpublished paper presented at SAIIA, 2007.
24. Wade Pendleton et al, ‘Migration and remittances.’
opportunities are available. Men, are more likely to travel to places of sectoral employment (particularly the mines for migrants from Mozambique and Lesotho) while women are more likely to migrate to urban areas where they can trade and shop. However, research with small scale cross-border traders across eight SADC countries indicates that traders travel widely including small towns across the region in their businesses.29

SAMP research has found that women, perhaps because of their reasons for migrating, their gendered family responsibilities and their participation in trade, are likely to migrate for shorter periods than men and more likely to migrate legally.30 Because they remain in South Africa for longer periods of their working lives, men are more likely to be integrated into social networks than women. Although men stay for longer periods, they still reported returning to their home countries regularly.

The 1997 SAMP study of potential and actual migrants found that women were more likely than men to say that they would not have the final say in whether they would migrate and that their family would strongly discourage them from doing so.31 However, a subsequent 2007 SAMP study of women migrants and refugees in South Africa challenged some of the findings.32 It found that most women made their own decisions to migrate and were not influenced by male family members, and some were encouraged by them to migrate. It suggests that migration is driven by household needs and allows women opportunities to work, make their own decisions, and have new experiences. Female small scale cross-border traders interviewed in Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, and who were likely to be the biggest earners in their households, said that they valued the financial independence their work brought to them.33 The women interviewed in the 2007 survey tended to say that they thought male migrants were as vulnerable, if not more vulnerable than women for a range of reasons.

Although the SAMP 1997 survey found women migrants are more likely to be married than their male counterparts, the SAMP 2006 survey of migration and remittances found that women migrants from Lesotho and Zimbabwe were less likely to be married than their male counterparts (77% of men and 36% of women in Lesotho and 62% of men and 54% of women in Zimbabwe).34

### 3.3. Types of migration flows

Labour migration flows in the region encompass permanent migrants, temporary, contract and seasonal workers, as well as refugees and asylum seekers. Traditionally, demand for cross-border migrant labour in SADC has largely emanated from the mining and commercial agricultural sectors and to a lesser extent the service sector. Table 7 presents the results of a SAMP 2006 survey which included 4,700 migrants from Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, most of whom were working in South Africa. Mine work remains the dominant sector of employment. It suggests that nationality has an influence on the kinds of employment available to migrant workers. It also shows that low paying sectors dominate employment of SADC nationals. Zimbabweans show a different profile – they are most likely to be in professional positions (over 40% including 7% teachers and 11% health workers) or work in the informal sector (20%). Women also find employment as manual workers, but not to the same extent as men.35

It was possible to disaggregate the SAMP 2006 data by sex for Lesotho and Zimbabwe,36 which show that domestic work is an important sector for Basotho women (44%) but not as much for Zimbabwean women (6%). The informal sector provides significant income-earning opportunities for women from both countries. Some 14% of female Basotho migrants (4% of men) and 47% of Zimbabwean women (20% of men) earn their incomes in the informal sector. The preponderance of

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30. Belinda Dodson, ‘Women on the move...’
31. Belinda Dodson, ‘Women on the move...’
32. Kate Lefko-Everett, ‘Voices from the margins: Recounting women’s migration experiences in southern Africa,’ SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 46, Cape Town and Kingston, SAMP, 2007.
35. For Basotho migrant workers 9% of men and 6% of women and for Zimbabweans 8% of men and 5% of women were manual workers.
women migrants working in this sector may reflect the strong associations between women, cross-border trade and migration as well as limited opportunities for women migrants in formal sectors of employment that employ cross-border migrants and women’s more generally limited access to the labour market in SADC. Incomes in domestic work and the informal sector tend to be low, thus compromising women’s ability to remit or the amount they remit.

However, data on Zimbabwean women migrants shows that women with education can find employment in business (3% compared to 6% of men) and as professionals (2% compared to 13% of men – excluding health and education). Not surprisingly, skilled migrant Zimbabwean women are most likely to be found working in the traditionally female professions of teaching (6% of both women and men) and as health workers (3% of men and 9% of women). So, available data on the work of women migrants suggest that it reflects the gendered nature of employment opportunities as well as educational opportunities.

### 3.3.1. Mine migration

In South Africa, the main destination of mine migrants, mining-related cross-border migration has centred on gold mines, although Mozambican mineworkers are also being recruited to platinum mines, and Angolan and Namibian workers can be found working on diamond extraction on the east coast. The mining sectors of Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe also employ foreign workers, but not to the same extent.

Almost all cross-border mine migrants working on South African gold mines were, and still are, employed through labour bureaus to serve fixed-term contracts, (although renewable) and are generally housed in single-sex mine compounds. The basis of these contracts lie in bilateral treaties between South Africa and the main countries of origin of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique), Swaziland and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). These treaties are still in operation and the mining sector still has privileged access to skilled, semi- and un-skilled male migrant mineworkers. It can also be said that semi- and un-skilled male mineworkers from countries of origin have privileged access to the South African labour market. However, working conditions and high rates of accidents, subsequent disability and work-related deaths mean the issue of privilege could be questioned. Although migration to the mines has been overwhelmingly (almost entirely) male, women did, and continue to, migrate to join husbands and partners and provide services to men working on and around the mines. However, no spousal or family permits are available to contract workers.

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**Table 7 - Occupations of migrants (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Botswana (N=633)</th>
<th>Lesotho (N=1076)</th>
<th>Mozambique (N=987)</th>
<th>Swaziland (N=1132)</th>
<th>Zimbabwe (N=857)</th>
<th>Total (N=4685)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture*</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service worker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine work</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual labour</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal sector</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/self employed</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/manager</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health worker</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Low rates of employment in agriculture may reflect the seasonal nature of most agricultural employment.

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37. Wade Pendleton et al., "Migration and remittances."
38. The collapse of the Zimbabwean economy and low rates of pay and poor conditions of work in hospitals and schools in Zimbabwe may have contributed to the number of migrants found working in these fields.
39. Currently, over 200 mineworkers die each year at work on South African mines. In the late 1800s and early 1900s tens of thousands of contract workers died of illness and injury, some even before they had reached the mines.
The South African gold mines no longer provide the opportunities they used to. Major changes in the structure of the labour force occurred between 1990 and 2006. The sector underwent massive retrenchments between 1990 and 2001, when employment declined by 45%. Since 2001, employment levels have increased slowly. In 1990, 47% of the labour force was foreign, and as South African workers were initially hardest hit by retrenchments, the proportion of foreign workers rose to 59% in 1997, but owing to rehiring of South African workers since 2001, foreign workers were only 38% of the workforce in 2006.

Mineworkers from Lesotho, originally the largest group of foreign workers, have been particularly hard hit. Employment has fallen by over 50% from almost 100,000 workers in 1990 to just over 46,000 in 2006. Mozambican workers fared better for some of this time, and employment of Mozambicans increased from 44,500 in 1990 to 55,800 in 1997. However, most of these new jobs were lost in the following decade. Mineworkers from Swaziland and Botswana form a much smaller proportion of the workforce, but have been hard hit. Employment of Batswana fell from 14,600 in 1990 to less than 3,000 in 2006, and that of Swazi mineworkers from 17,700 to just over 7,000 over the same period. It is not entirely clear what the full impact of these retrenchments has been on the gender dynamics of migration and households. However, available evidence from Lesotho shows it has propelled increasing numbers of women to migrate to the capital of Lesotho, Maseru, to take up work in textile factories, as well as to pursue employment in South Africa. Retrenchments have obviously also had a significant impact on the national economy and household economies in Lesotho owing to the loss of remittances.

3.3.2. Migration to the agricultural sector

Commercial agriculture is another significant area of employment for cross-border migrants in SADC and encompasses women and men. Cross-border migrants are employed in commercial agriculture in Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and until recently in Zimbabwe. Forced changes in land ownership in Zimbabwe since the late 1990s have led to retrenchments of Malawian and Mozambican farm workers. In South Africa, foreign labour has been used by commercial agriculture for over a century. Special permits as well as contracts have been used for the employment of foreign farm workers, and labour bureaus and brokers are used by some farmers in South Africa.

South African patterns of employment of migrants in commercial agriculture are complex and show some gendered aspects. Research shows that agriculture employs documented and undocumented migrants, as well as long-term, temporary and seasonal workers. A 1996 national survey found that 30% of South African farms employed SADC migrants, of whom over 50% had worked on the farm for more than five years. A subsequent 1999 SAMP survey of farms and migrant farm workers in border areas found some gender differences. Mozambican women employed on farms tended to be refugees from the civil war, who had arrived in South Africa in the 1980s and still lived there. However, migrant Mozambican farm workers were overwhelmingly male and young. Male migrant farm workers were more likely to have come from homes in Mozambique. Zimbabwean migrant farm workers were found to be equally likely to be male or female. Workers in the Lesotho area were generally older women with households in Lesotho. Women workers are most likely to be employed in harvesting, packing and pruning. Thus their work is likely to be seasonal and low paid.

3.3.3. Domestic work

Domestic work in SADC is highly sex-segregated. Owing to racist fears of black men working in houses (and close to white women) which emerged in the early 1900s, house work has largely become the domain of women in South Africa and Zimbabwe. However, in other countries in the region men are equally employed as domestic workers in houses (and in some areas may even dominate the sector). Gardening is everywhere the domain of male workers.

Although domestic work comprises a significant area of employment for migrant women in other parts of the

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40. TEBA, unpublished data.
41. Sechaba Consultants, Lesotho; Jonathan Crush, ‘Borderline farming…’
42. Cited in Jonathan Crush, ‘Borderline farming…’
43. Jonathan Crush, ‘Borderline farming…’
world, research undertaken in Johannesburg in 2004 suggests that this may not be the case in SADC.\textsuperscript{44} The survey found that although over 80\% of the women interviewed were migrant workers, only 6\% were international/cross-border migrants. However SAMP research on migration and remittances found 44\% of Basotho female migrants and 6\% of Zimbabwean women migrants were employed as domestic workers. So while South African women may dominate employment in the second largest sector of employment for women in the country, domestic work also provides employment opportunities for migrant women. SADC women do not seem to be in high demand overseas as domestic workers and nannies/au pairs. Male migrants may be employed in domestic service (in South Africa usually as gardeners), though less than 1\% of Basotho and Zimbabwean male migrants were thus employed. There is no evidence to suggest that migrant women are more or less likely to undertake sex work than South African nationals, however financial vulnerability may lead some migrant women to do so.

3.3.4. Other sectors of employment

In South Africa other areas of employment for male migrant workers include the service and construction sectors,\textsuperscript{45} though pay for unskilled workers in both is low. A recent survey of construction workers in Johannesburg found that many earned even less than domestic workers.\textsuperscript{46} Migrant construction workers are also likely to work as casual labourers, further compromising their working conditions. Men and women (particularly Zimbabweans) are also employed in the service sector, particularly in restaurants.

3.3.5. Cross-border trade and the informal sector

Although not always considered ‘migration’ per se, small-scale cross-border trade provides a significant income earning opportunity for women in the region. A 2006 survey which monitored over 85,000 traders passing through 20 border posts connecting ten countries in the region found that over 40\% of traders were women.\textsuperscript{47} At some border posts over 50\% of traders were women and at the main border post between Zimbabwe and South Africa, 70\% of traders were women. These traders travel often and usually for short periods of time. However, those traveling longer distances tended to stay longer (i.e., several weeks) in the country of destination.

As noted above, the informal sector provides an important area of income earning, particularly for women and Zimbabweans. Migrants work as vendors, street traders, hawkers and in productive activities in the informal sector. A SAMP study on immigrant entrepreneurs with small businesses (mainly informal sector) in Johannesburg, found 16\% were run by women, 64\% of whom were from SADC.\textsuperscript{48} A majority of the female entrepreneurs were single. Indicating transnational relationships, 65\% of these immigrant entrepreneurs ran similar businesses elsewhere in Africa. The majority of the immigrants from other SADC countries acquired their start-up capital from money earned in employment in South Africa. However, the study provides no information on remittances sent from the profits of these enterprises.

3.3.6. Skilled migration and emigration

Globalization is associated with increased opportunities for mobility for skilled professionals and the internationalization of professional labour markets.\textsuperscript{49} Many countries are increasingly using imported labour to make up for shortfalls in skilled workers and counter the impact of aging populations. The loss of skilled and professional workers from the sub-Saharan region to Europe and the Americas is stark. Between 1960 and 1987 Africa lost 30\% of its highly-skilled nationals, mostly to Europe. Between 1986 and 1990 50,000 to 60,000 middle- to high-level managers emigrated in response to deteriorating socio-economic conditions in Africa. Of the 3.6 million Africans living outside the continent, 100,000 are professionals. An estimated

\textsuperscript{44} Sally Peberdy and Natalya Dinat, ‘Migration and domestic workers: Worlds of work health and mobility in Johannesburg,’ \textit{SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 40, Cape Town and Kingston: SAMP, 2005.}
\textsuperscript{46} Sally Peberdy \textit{et al.}, ‘Migrant construction workers…’
\textsuperscript{47} Sally Peberdy, ‘Small scale cross-border…’
\textsuperscript{48} C.M. Rogerson, ‘International Migration, Immigrant Entrepreneurs and South Africa’s Small Enterprise Economy’, \textit{SAMP Migration Policy Series No.3, 1997.}
23,000 university graduates and 50 000 executives leave Africa annually, adding to the 40,000 African PhD graduates living abroad. Adepoju (2006) notes that aid programmes in Africa employ some 100,000 expatriates possessing the very skills lost to the continent, at a cost of some US$4 billion annually.

The emigration of skilled professionals from the region to other parts of the world is of considerable concern to SADC governments. The IT, engineering, health and education sectors are hardest hit. The first two are male-dominated professions, while the health sector, particularly nursing, and teaching are female-dominated professions. The loss of professionals is of concern to governments as it affects their ability to deliver services and maintain development and represents a loss of investment in education.

Research on skilled migration from the region is limited, particularly pertaining to the migration of skilled women. Emigration statistics are notoriously poor and many migrants leave on short-term contracts and so are not captured as emigrants. Attempts have been made in the health sector to minimize the brain drain of health workers and its effects. These provide codes of practice for recruitment and treatment of health workers, exchange programs for training and development and the provision of health professionals to South Africa from specific countries. They include the 2003 Commonwealth Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Workers (Annexure A), signed by all Commonwealth countries as well as bilateral agreements with Britain. Britain is also providing assistance to Malawi in the development of a nursing school to compensate for the number of nurses who are emigrating to the UK.

Skilled migrants also move within SADC (called ‘brain circulation’) indicating an exchange of skills between countries in the region. Botswana, Namibia and South Africa are the most popular destinations for skilled migrants in SADC. However, countries which can attract skills can also experience skills shortages (e.g., South Africa, Botswana) and may need skills from other countries in the region and elsewhere to make up for them. In Namibia in 1997, 18% of senior officials and 14% of professionals in public posts were foreign workers. Botswana is home to foreign medical professionals, including nurses, academics as well as skilled artisans. South Africa attracts professionals in most sectors, although only around 45,000 work permits are issued each year.

SAMP research undertaken in Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Zimbabwe in the late 1990s on the emigration potential of professionals found that although their reasons for wanting to migrate were similar, women were less likely than their male counterparts to want to migrate and were more likely to want to go for shorter periods of time. The perspective of women interviewees may have been influenced by the fact that they had less travel experience and were less likely to have contact with professional associations, in addition to the impact of gender roles and relations. Skilled emigration from South Africa is dominated by white professionals, but black professionals are also increasingly leaving the country.

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50. Proportions of primary school teachers who are women in SADC: Botswana (79%), DRC (21%), Lesotho (80%), Malawi (46%), Madagascar (60%), Mauritius (63%), Mozambique (30%), Namibia (61%), South Africa (74%), Swaziland (75%), Zambia (48%), Zimbabwe (51%). Proportions of secondary school teachers who are women: Angola (33%), Botswana (47%), DRC (10%), Lesotho (56%), Malawi (24%), Madagascar (44%), Mauritius (55%), Namibia (35%), South Africa (50%), Swaziland (61%), Zambia (10%), Zimbabwe (40%) (UN Statistics Directorate).


Remittances have implications for both sending and recipient countries as well as households. Household formations, gendered migration patterns, and gender relations may have an impact on who sends remittances, how they are sent, who receives them, as well as how they are used. There is little evidence of communities gathering together to send collective remittances for use in recipient communities in the SADC. However, recipient communities with high rates of out-migration may benefit indirectly from remittances, though not on an organized collective basis. An overview summary analysis of the impact of migrant remittances in SADC is conceptualized in Table 8.

Migrant remittances in SADC are not comprehensively researched or documented, even though the practice dates back over a century. Furthermore, sex-disaggregated data and gendered analyses relating to remittance flows, behaviour and utilization of migrant remittances in SADC is extremely limited. This is

### Table 8 - Key impacts of remittances on poverty at different levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Poverty-reducing impacts</th>
<th>Other impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household</td>
<td>Income and consumption smoothing</td>
<td>Dependence on remittances leaves households vulnerable to changes in migration/employment cycles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased savings and asset accumulation, collateral for loans; liquidity in times of crisis</td>
<td>High proportion of remittance s used on non-productive and short-term consumption gains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved access to health services and better nutrition</td>
<td>Differentiated access to additional resources in accordance with sex or age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to better education for longer, reducing child labour</td>
<td>Adoption of innovations un-suited to local environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased social capital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved access to information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Improved local physical infrastructure</td>
<td>Initially can increase inequality between households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growth of local commodity markets</td>
<td>Spatial concentration of remittances might increase regional inequalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of local capital markets and new services: banking, retail, travel &amp; construction</td>
<td>Distortions in local factor markets (particularly land and labour)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of new development institutions</td>
<td>Transmission of negative cultural practices that reduce local quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changes to cultural practices, especially regarding girl children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Generation of local employment opportunities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction of inequality between households, particularly poor households</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Possible multiplier effects of the greater consumption allowed by remittances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enables people to pay for health and education services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Improved foreign currency inflows</td>
<td>Fluctuations in exchange rates (particularly amongst those with low GDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment creation through investment in productive sectors</td>
<td>Growth in parallel foreign exchange markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased human capital as migrants learn new skills and work practices</td>
<td>Distortions in property markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Withdrawal of state welfare programmes due to remittance inflows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Reduction in inequality among countries as remittances exceed official aid transfers in some regions</td>
<td>Possible negative effects in the balance of payments (currency revaluation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dependence on unreliable sources of foreign exchange subject to cyclical fluctuations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Potential for money laundering</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Admos Chimbowu et al in SAMP, 2006, p.12
despite the long history of migration in the region as a household livelihood strategy and therefore, the likely history of remittances over the past century.

This section draws on a number of recent surveys on remittances in SADC. They include surveys undertaken by FinMark Trust (Finscope 2003) and Genesis Analytics (CGAP 2005) which explored how money is transferred in the region and access to banking and financial services. The CGAP study documents the difficulty in estimating migrant numbers due to poor data collection, as well as in estimating the extent of irregular migration; little bureaucratic capacity; and little intra-SADC country co-operation. Using a limited number of focus groups, the study examined the pattern of remittances to Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Lesotho. Zimbabwe was excluded as the massive official and ‘black market’ exchange rate disparity makes the institutionalization of remittances unviable. These surveys do not provide sex-disaggregated data.

The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) undertook a survey of cross-border migrant remittances in five SADC countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Southern Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe). Data was collected from 4,700 households with migrants. It examined examining the values, methods, uses and impact of remittances on recipient households and gathered data on the migrants as well. Because the number of households receiving remittances from women migrants was low, only limited conclusions could be drawn on differences in the remittance behaviour of men and women migrants, and the only for migrants from Lesotho and Zimbabwe. While extremely useful, the survey did not ask questions which would allow for a more in-depth gendered analysis, particularly regarding the utilization and impact of remittances.

Beside these multi-country studies, the paper also draws on a number of country specific surveys. For the DRC, it draws on a study of the relationships between remittances and poverty alleviation strategies at macro and household levels. In Lesotho, on a World Bank survey of migration and remittances that provides a global overview as well as poverty studies. In Malawi, the paper draws on a 2004 study of the impact of migrant remittances. The authors note that this was the first to examine the impact of migrant remittances, and the relationships between Malawian migration policy and remittances. However, the study is based on data collected in the 1990s and ends in 2000. It includes data on remittances from internal and cross-border migrants, where most of the latter were working in South Africa. In Mozambique the paper draws on the SAMP survey as well as a 2006 study that used surveys of 4,000 rural households in the north, central and southern regions of Mozambique.

In addition to the SAMP survey, information on remittances to Zimbabwe came from two other surveys. The first is a detailed 2005 study on migrant remittances. Conducted through a survey of 300 households, it sought to ‘explore the extent to which migrant remittance transfers affect poverty with particular reference to the medium of the informal economy.’ The second is a more localized 2004 study which examines the impact of migrant remittances on communities in the southern districts of Zimbabwe conducted by France Maphosa. Unfortunately none of these studies provide sex-disaggregated data on remittances or a gendered analysis of their utilization and impact.

### 4.1. Values and amounts remitted

National data on the value of remittances received and sent by SADC countries is patchy, and not all countries

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record, or use, probable available data to calculate the value of remittances that are sent through formal channels. The paucity of data on remittances sent through formal channels is surprising given the stringency of foreign exchange controls of SADC countries. However, the formal banking systems of some countries are weak and small and in the case of DRC virtually non-existent (although formal money transfer agencies operate). Estimating the value of remittances is further complicated as existing research shows that the majority of intra-regional remittances are sent informally and do not pass through any accounting system that can record them. Furthermore, SADC migrants do not only remit money but also send and carry goods home as part of their remittances.

Whilst the level and value of recorded sub-Saharan African remittances is far lower than Asia and Latin America, the value of remittances to the region has shown a pronounced increase from less than US$2 billion in 1990 to US$8 billion in 2005.60 Furthermore, discrepancies in absolute values do not necessarily reflect their value to recipient households. An overview of the estimated value of intra-regional remittance flows within SADC in 2005 is provided in table 9.

The CGAP study estimates the value of remittances from South Africa to SADC countries as R6.1 billion or US$820 million (at the exchange rate of R7.4/US$). This estimate is based on: i) the current requirements of the governments of SADC countries with respect to contract miner remittances; ii) the 60% of migrants who remit and the fact that they remit 30% of their earnings; and iii) that there are an estimated 2.1 million SADC migrants in South Africa.

Table 10 - Value of migrant worker inward remittances to Lesotho (US$)62

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remittances received by countries in the region can be very important to their national economies. Remittances account for some 4.2% of the GDP in Swaziland, one of the ten highest in Africa.63 A 2006 IMF study notes that remittances to Lesotho constitute the highest ratio to GDP of any sub-Saharan African country and represent a full 60% of the value of the country’s exports.64 The value of officially recorded remittances in 2005 represented some 22.5% of GDP, but the true figure is accepted as being higher. Nevertheless the value of remittances has dropped from above 63% of GDP at the height of the Basotho mining migration in 1989. By 1993 this figure had already dropped to 46% of GDP. By 2006 the figure is likely to have fallen even further as mine employment of Basotho fell by almost 50% between 1993 and 2006, when almost 44,000 mineworkers lost their jobs.

Table 9 - Intra-regional remittance flows (ZAR)61 (1US$ = +/-7ZAR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending country</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Lesotho</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>RSA</th>
<th>Swaziland</th>
<th>Other SADC</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>29.64</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>51.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>133.28</td>
<td>1,675.84</td>
<td>57.19</td>
<td>2,241.71</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>432.29</td>
<td>1,531.85</td>
<td>6,072.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>134.46</td>
<td>1,678.43</td>
<td>60.84</td>
<td>2,241.71</td>
<td>29.64</td>
<td>432.84</td>
<td>1,583.27</td>
<td>6,161.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

60. The accuracy of such figures should be treated with a degree of circumspection given the preponderance of informal remittance channels used.
61. Genesis Analytics, ‘Supporting Remittances.’
4.2. Money vs. goods as remittances

Table 11 - Remittances received by households as cash and goods (%) 65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>Goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2006 SAMP survey found that the overwhelming majority of migrant-sending households (85%) receive remittances as cash.66 Many households also receive remitted goods, though the country-by-country pattern varies significantly (see Table 11). Given its currency crisis and the shortage of imported goods it is understandable that Zimbabweans (68%) remit more goods than any other migrants, although 84% of households reported receiving cash. This is followed by 65% of Mozambican migrant households. Mineworkers comprised a significant proportion of migrants in the Mozambican survey. They are able to access subsidized transport for goods to Mozambique and to certain duty-free goods when in Mozambique. A mere 17% of Swazi migrants remit goods, followed by 20% of Basotho.

The SAMP findings are echoed in the 2006 Zimbabwe study of Bracking and Sachikonye, which found that 74% of households receiving remittances received both goods and money.67 Perhaps counter-intuitively, Bracking and Sachikonye found that relatively higher income families did not receive a higher proportion of cash than food as a form of remittance. Conversely poorer families did not receive a higher proportion of food as a remittance. In other words, poverty did not directly correlate to the form of remittance received amongst the households surveyed. The range of goods received is also perhaps surprising. Whilst food, clothing and footwear are all frequently received, luxury goods also feature prominently. These include DVDs, cellular phones, televisions and music systems. Some migrants carry goods such as second-hand clothing from South Africa for resale at ‘flea markets’ in Zimbabwe, as this translates into a more inflation-proof form of remittance for the recipient. Whilst this can be accounted for by the acute shortage of consumer goods in Zimbabwe, it also indicates that migration and remittances are not merely survival strategies of the poor, but form part of a more complex and organic response to a structural crisis within the political economy of the country.

Both the SAMP and Bracking and Sachikonye surveys found that most goods are transported and delivered by migrants themselves. This was followed by goods remitted by a friend or family friend and thirdly by a trusted person sent to retrieve the goods from the migrant. Almost 82% of households receive goods informally transported by somebody known to them, as opposed to formal delivery, courier, or postal services.

4.3. Methods used to remit money

4.3.1. Formal methods

Formal remittance channels in SADC countries are stringently controlled. Official exchange control regulations can limit who can transfer money outside the country, as well as how much can be sent and received. Formal remittance channels include banks, the post office and money transfer agencies. Mine migrants also have access to TEBA Bank. This is a service provided to mineworkers by The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA), the main mineworker recruiting company. Irregular migrants are excluded from formal means of remitting. In some countries this can include being excluded from using money transfer companies. Although banks such as hawala which straddle formal and informal banking operate in the region they are not widely used by SADC migrants. However, anecdotal reports suggest similar, but entirely informal, banking systems are developing for Zimbabwean migrants.

4.3.2. Access to formal remittance channels

Access to banking in the region is problematic. South African banks have few branches in the region to facilitate formal banking transfers. Now that large South African banks are expanding into the region, different

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65. Wade Pendleton et al., ‘Migrant remittances.’
66. Wade Pendleton et al., ‘Migrant remittances.’
67. Sarah Barking and Lloyd Sachikonye, ‘Remittances, poverty.’
systems and technical platforms are proving hard to integrate, leading to relatively high costs and inefficiencies for remitters. Clearance times for money transfers through banks are notoriously long, not only between SADC but within SADC countries. Even when cross-bank transfers are available most banks in the region have only a limited distribution of branches focused on urban areas, adding travel costs and time to other recipient costs. The same is true of money transfer agencies.

Post-9/11 banking requirements exclude many migrants from accessing banking services as they may not be able to provide the necessary information to open a bank account or use the services of money transfer companies. In South Africa, evidence suggests that even when migrants are entitled to open bank accounts and can meet the requirements, they are often refused access. These requirements have also been linked to the closure of Western Union offices in South Africa on 31 December, 2001. Western Union’s appointed agents in South Africa found it increasingly difficult to adequately meet the South African Reserve Bank’s reporting, administration and compliance criteria, particularly after 9/11, and have not returned to South Africa, despite enjoying some 24% of the market globally. This is somewhat unfortunate as Western Union’s cost structures, particularly at the lower end of the cash transfer scale, were far lower than the banks. MoneyGram now operate through Standard Bank, but their transfer costs tend to be high.

Even nationals can find it difficult to open bank accounts and access banks because of post 9/11 banking requirements, and because many also live far from banking facilities. The Finscope survey found that significant numbers of people in their survey were “unbanked” or “financially excluded.” This was particularly true of people in rural areas. In Botswana, 15% were financially excluded (7% urban, 19% rural); in Namibia 39% (27% urban, 51% rural); in Lesotho 36% (28% urban, 38% rural); and in Swaziland 48% (33% urban, 54% rural). This means that even if the migrant can send money through a bank, the recipient may not be able to collect it.

The CGAP study reinforces the arguments above that identify barriers to formal remittances (although largely from a commercial perspective): exchange control legislation in South Africa tends to squeeze new entrants from the market, anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financial control measures (including know your customer legislation) is highly restrictive, and immigration laws make it particularly difficult for un-skilled workers to find employment in South Africa legally, thus they are unable to enter the formal banking sector.

In 2004 the Zimbabwean government recruited formal money transfer companies and agencies into its Home Link institution, which resulted in Western Union being unable to pay out recipients in US$, but provided more favourable exchange rates. Despite an intensive government advertising campaign to induce people to use its services, data suggest that it is not a popular institution for migrant remittances and may be viewed with a degree of scepticism or suspicion, and cannot compete with parallel market exchange rates.

The Finscope and CGAP surveys do not provide sex-disaggregated data on access to financial services. However, women in many countries are more likely than men to be excluded from formal banking. And in Botswana and Swaziland women have to provide permission from their husbands or fathers before they can open a bank account. In Botswana this also means that the father or husband is liable for any debts incurred by their wife or daughter.

4.3.3. Informal methods

Informal money transfer systems (IMTS) account for the overwhelming preponderance of remittances from South Africa to the region. These are principally remittances carried by migrants themselves, remittances carried by friends and family and remittances sent with taxi, bus and truck drivers. Such IMTS are possible by virtue of the contiguous borders and transport channels of SADC migrant countries. Reflecting circular migration patterns and relative geographic proximity, many SADC migrants can drive and even walk home across borders.

68. Because of living conditions (as with some nationals) many cannot provide proof of address etc.
70. Genesis Analytics, ‘Supporting Remittances…’
71. In SADC taxis refer to mini-buses which transport people across the region.
and so carry their remittances with them, or send them with a taxi driver or friend.

The surveys by Genesis Analytics examine the modalities, channels, utilization and costs of migrant remittances from South Africa to SADC countries. They examine informal money transfers, formal banking products, money transfer agency products and Post Office products. They argue that IMTS offer the following advantages:

- Cheap service for relatively small amounts and particularly when compared to bank charges
- No monthly charges
- Based on familial/communal networks
- Avoidance of currency/exchange controls
- Avoidance of distorted exchange valuations (such as in Zimbabwe)
- Avoidance of government taxes
- Avoidance of receiving end charges
- No documentation required and thus avoidance of literacy constraints and confusion/exploitation
- Transfers from illegal migrants can be facilitated

The CGAP study, despite the difficulty in calculating the number of migrants in South Africa estimated the relative proportion of different methods of remitting to overall remittance flows (see Table 12).

The 2003 survey of access to financial services revealed the following remittance patterns:

**Table 13 - Methods used to send money (Finscope)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Namibia</th>
<th>Lesotho</th>
<th>Swaziland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfer money via a bank</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer money via a Post Office</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer money via the internet</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer via telegraphic transfer</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent money with a friend or family member</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivered the money personally</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By tax or bus</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t send money to my family</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reflecting the wide use of informal methods, the overwhelming majority of respondents surveyed received their money as cash.

**Table 14 - How money is received**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How is money received?</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Namibia</th>
<th>Lesotho</th>
<th>Swaziland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>96.0%</td>
<td>88.9%</td>
<td>98.2%</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheque</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Account deposit</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 2006 SAMP survey, which encompassed the remittance behaviour of over 4,700 migrants, found that over three quarters used informal means to remit money. The most common method cited was for the migrant him/herself to bring the money home. Migrant households were satisfied with using informal means and 88% said they had no problems with the methods used.

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72. Genesis Analytics ‘Supporting Remittances...’ p. xii.
73. FinMark Trust, ‘Finscope 2003: Profiling Demand...’
74. FinMark Trust, ‘Finscope 2003: Profiling Demand...’
75. Wade Pendleton et al., ‘Migrant remittances...’
Barking and Sachikonye found that just over 58% of Zimbabwean households who received money did so through informal channels.\(^7^7\) Perhaps reflecting the higher rate of migrants living overseas, some 26% receive remitted money into a bank account. Convenience of receipt features as a prominent reason for recipient households to select a particular method of transfer. The study does not clarify whether this also accounts for the method selected by the remitting migrant. Also in Zimbabwe, Maphosa found that 67% of those surveyed sent and received remittances via ‘cross-border transporters’.

Maphosa found that cross-border transporters can reach the recipient community in Zimbabwe from Johannesburg in one day, thus assuring speed of delivery. Moreover, the delivery of cash is made to the doorstep of the recipient. Such remittance channels are not without their problems however, with losses, non-delivery and swaps being reported. Furthermore, cross-border transporters may operate a form of cartel that leaves the remitter and recipient at the mercy of the service provider and fearful of challenging questionable, unethical or dishonest practices. However, this contrasts with the SAMP survey, which showed high rates of satisfaction with informal methods.

4.3.4. Relative costs of formal and informal methods

Banks charge high rates for intra-country money transfers in SADC. Charges are incurred by the sender and by the recipient. Currently the cheapest method of cash remittance between South Africa and SADC countries is Post Office postal orders and telegraphic postal orders. TEBA provides for cash remittances to agencies in Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Mozambique, in which migrant miners can access cash savings. TEBA transfer costs are the lowest, while money transfer agencies also charge high rates. Charges are proportionately higher for those transferring smaller amounts.

The costs per R100 remitted through IMTS vary in accordance with distance, frequency, familiarity with the carrier/courier and systems of value exchanges and off-sets. Friends often charge R10 per R100 for transporting cash to Zimbabwe for example. A taxi driver can charge up to 20% of the cash value transported/remitted.\(^7^8\) Some taxi drivers charge a minimum fee and then a percentage per R100. Such fee structures often incentivize migrants to remit less frequently, for example quarterly rather than monthly, to reduce the unit cost of each remittance. In addition to formal taxi operators, Zimbabweans and Mozambicans are known to drive migrants’ cash to and from border posts as a living. Beyond cash remittances, non-cash remittances such as food, consumer goods and clothing are facilitated by taxi drivers in particular. The current rate for transporting food is approximately R5/kg. The relative cost of remittances is indicated in Figure 1 and the perceived risks highlighted in the grey bars.

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76. Wade Pendleton et al., ‘Migrant remittances…’
77. Sarah Barking and Lloyd Sachikonye, ‘Remittances, poverty…’
78. Genesis Analytics, ‘Supporting Remittances…’
4.3.5. Choice of methods

None of the existing research indicates who in the household determines the transfer method used, however the decision is likely to rest with the migrant. In terms of the method of remittance used, the CGAP study notes the following selection/decision-making criteria:

- **Ease** – the channel with the least paperwork, records, or bureaucracy
- **Familiarity** – the channel most used by friends or previously used by family
- **Cost** – although migrants may have limited knowledge for their decision-making, perceptions were built up through their own and others’ experiences regarding cost
- **Speed** – this is particularly important when remitting for an emergency in the home country
- **Risk tolerance** – migrants are less risk tolerant (of theft or loss) in accordance with the value of the remittance
- **Access** – the ease with which the recipient can receive the money

The overall findings of the CGAP study, namely that migrants decision-making regarding the channel of remittance depends on a mix of costs/benefits, familiarity and risk analysis largely supports the findings of a 2005 World Bank study on remittance costs, determinants and informal flows.\(^\text{79}\)

### 4.4. Mineworkers and compulsory deferred pay

Male mineworkers have privileged access to formal methods of remitting money, however this may provide benefits to their dependents at home, including their wives and partners. They are able to access low-cost banking and money transfer services provided by TEBA, which is the primary recruiting company for mineworkers. TEBA provides services in areas from which mineworkers are recruited. Mineworkers can arrange for designated dependents, usually their partners, to collect money from their account. The amount can be stipulated by the migrant and their wives can hold their own accounts with TEBA to which the miner can deposit money.

A long-standing compulsory deferred pay system operates for contract mineworkers from Mozambique and Lesotho. Mozambican miners are required to remit 60% of their income to Mozambique for six months of the year. This money can only be collected in Mozambique. Mineworkers from Lesotho are required to remit 30% of their income for ten months of the year (until 1990 they were required to remit 60%). At the end of their contracts miners are issued with a deferred payment certificate from the mine which is then converted at TEBA into an interest certificate, which is then cashed at a TEBA branch in the home country. TEBA can also be used for other funds that mineworkers wish to send home.

The compulsory deferred pay scheme prevents mineworkers from spending their money when and where they wish and where the scheme is voluntary, as in Botswana and Swaziland, the take up rates are far lower.

Research has established that whilst this system is not popular with mineworkers, who feel it should be optional, it is overwhelmingly popular with their spouses, who fear a loss of income if the system is abandoned as the migrant could ‘waste’ the money. It is also supported by the Lesotho and Mozambican governments who have similar fears. An argument can thus be made that despite its forced and discriminatory nature (it applies only to Basotho and Mozambican mineworkers), the scheme ensures high levels of remittance. It also means that the dependents of miners have a better chance of receiving support. And, for wives who are made a designated recipient, it means they can receive money even when the miner does not return home regularly. This is particularly important for women and other dependents in Mozambique where SAMP found 46% of migrants returned home only once a year.\textsuperscript{80} Data from Lesotho indicate that the scheme maintains high levels of remittances.

Table 16 - Lesotho miners’ income and remittances\textsuperscript{81}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average number employed</th>
<th>Average yearly wage/ miner</th>
<th>Total miner income</th>
<th>Miners’ remittances</th>
<th>% of income remitted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1096.2</td>
<td>820.1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1282.7</td>
<td>961.1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>1378.6</td>
<td>1041.1</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1476.0</td>
<td>1103.8</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>1554.4</td>
<td>1126.5</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average number employed in 1,000s of persons; wages in 1,000s of Rand; income and remittances in millions of Rand

The compulsory deferred pay of migrant miners is important to the national economies of Lesotho and Mozambique. It is paid by the mining companies to a Deferred Pay Fund and then to the central bank. Historically, this has accounted for up to 25% of Mozambique’s foreign exchange earnings.\textsuperscript{82} Table 17 indicates the historical (but diminishing) importance of miners’ remittances to the Lesotho economy. Since 1993, mine employment for Lesotho has fallen by almost 50% and almost 44,000 workers have lost their jobs.

4.5. Frequency & amounts remitted

As the majority of migrants carry remittances themselves, the regularity and frequency at which remittances are received is related to how often they return home. The frequency and reliability of remittance receipt affects recipient households and how remittances can be utilized. The frequency of remittance is also strongly correlated to the amount and value received.\textsuperscript{84} The more frequent the remittance period, the higher the overall value of remittance.

SAMP found that although patterns were heavily influenced by distance and availability of transport, 30% of all migrants return home on a monthly basis, 13% on a quarterly basis, with a further 19% returning home on an annual basis.\textsuperscript{85} Mozambicans returned least frequently (43% once a year), whilst 56% of Basotho return home monthly. However, 59% of households received remittances once a month with those in Lesotho (77%) and Swaziland (72%) being most likely to do so and those in Mozambique (20%) being least likely to do so.

Table 17 - Miners remittances and national product (GDP and GNP in millions of Rands)\textsuperscript{83}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>GNP</th>
<th>Miners’ remittances/GDP</th>
<th>Miners’ remittances/GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>2348</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1564</td>
<td>2805</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>3099</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2131</td>
<td>3506</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2476</td>
<td>4167</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{80} Wade Pendleton et al., ‘Migrant remittances…’
\textsuperscript{81} World Bank, ‘Migration and Remittances in Lesotho’, Migration and Remittances Team, Development Prospects Group, World Bank, www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances. It should be noted that the estimates of the number of miners employed are higher than data provided by TEBEA.
\textsuperscript{82} Fion De Vletter, ‘Sons of Mozambique: Mozambican Miners and Post-Apartheid South Africa’, SAMP Migration Policy Series No.8, 1998.
\textsuperscript{83} World Bank, ‘Migration and Remittances in Lesotho…’
\textsuperscript{84} Fion de Vletter, ‘Migration and development…’
\textsuperscript{85} Wade Pendleton et al., ‘Migrant remittances….’, p.27.
Bracking and Sachikonye found that of the 300 households sampled in Zimbabwe, 49.7% received remittances from family or friends who had migrated or emigrated. Of these, 24.7% of remittances were received from the United Kingdom and 22.7% from South Africa. A further 6% came from the United States and 11% was divided between Botswana and Namibia. Of those surveyed, 75% had received remittances within the previous month.

SAMP found the annual median amounts of money remitted to migrant-sending households by country were: Botswana R8,306; Lesotho R7,800; Swaziland R4,800; Mozambique R1,760; and Zimbabwe R1,093 per annum. Although the amounts may seem relatively small, incomes for un- and semi-skilled workers in the region are low. As is discussed below, cash remittances are important to the incomes of most recipient households and were a major source of income for the majority of households. The annual median value of goods remitted was lower for Botswana (R2,307); Lesotho (R1,000); Mozambique (R1,257); Swaziland (R600); and Zimbabwe (R549).

Conversely, in his localized study in Zimbabwe Maphosa found that goods remittances were of greater value than cash remittances. Goods included foodstuffs, consumer goods, agricultural and building inputs. Few records were kept of the financial value of remittances and it should be noted that respondents were reluctant to discuss or disclose the value of cash remittances for fear of governmental inspection, or loss of aid support from NGOs and rural development agencies.

The amount of remittances received may also reflect the relationships between the remittance sender and recipient. In Mozambique, household heads appear to remit more than any other category and in greatest values. The next most important category of relationship is remittances from sons and daughters. Parents remitting appear to remit more in value, but could also be included in the head of household category (see Table 19). Furthermore, married migrants remit more than their single compatriots and the highest value of remittance is found among the 40-59 age cohort.

### Table 18 - Frequency of receiving remittances (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Botswana (N=536)</th>
<th>Lesotho (N=1027)</th>
<th>Mozambique (N=661)</th>
<th>Swaziland (N=971)</th>
<th>Zimbabwe (N=787)</th>
<th>Total (N=3982)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Twice a month</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once in 3 months</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once in 6 months</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a year</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 19 - Money sent home: Average amount over a year by Migrant type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Valid N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>N=285</td>
<td>$570.31</td>
<td>$417.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse/partner</td>
<td>N=26</td>
<td>$316.91</td>
<td>$219.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son/daughter</td>
<td>N=224</td>
<td>$341.41</td>
<td>$173.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father/mother</td>
<td>N=3</td>
<td>$628.99</td>
<td>$608.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother/sister</td>
<td>N=27</td>
<td>$317.01</td>
<td>$173.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandchild</td>
<td>N=3</td>
<td>$333.33</td>
<td>$434.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son/daughter-in-law</td>
<td>N=2</td>
<td>$165.22</td>
<td>$165.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nephew/niece</td>
<td>N=5</td>
<td>$456.96</td>
<td>$217.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other relative</td>
<td>N=1</td>
<td>$380.43</td>
<td>$380.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=553</td>
<td>$457.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=23</td>
<td>$374.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fion de Vletter, ‘Migration and development...’

Although women are often believed to remit more regularly than men, SAMP and de Vletter found that women were likely to remit less than men and were marginally less likely to send money or goods home. Some 94% of Basotho men and 92% of women sent money home; 37% of men and 33% women sent goods; and 40%

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86. Wade Pendleton et al., ‘Migrant remittances...’
87. Fion de Vletter, ‘Migration and development...’; Wade Pendleton et al., ‘Migration and remittances...’
88. Wade Pendleton et al., ‘Migration and remittances...’; Fion de Vletter, ‘Migration and development...’
of men provided money for emergency situations compared to 38% of women migrants. In Zimbabwe, 86% of male migrants remitted money and 82% of women. However, Zimbabwean women (75%) were more likely than men (65%) to remit goods, while 56% of men and 54% of women migrants provided emergency funds. The study found little difference in the frequency at which remittances were made although women were slightly more likely to remit once a month or more (in Lesotho 79% of women against 77% of men and in Zimbabwe 92% of men and 96% of women).

De Vletter found that in Mozambique, his small sample of women remitted 20% less than men per capita, but he does not analyze migrant income differentials by sex. This may reflect gender bias in employment and the generally lower incomes received by women workers, as well as wage discrimination. Although amounts remitted may be lower, SAMP in Lesotho found that remittances from women migrants were more likely to be rated as “very important” (54%) to the recipient household compared to those of male migrants (43%). In Zimbabwe, the difference was marginal with 84% of female and 83% of male remittances being reported as “very important” to the household. From available data it is unclear why remittances from women may be more likely to be very important to their recipient households than those of men.

4.6. Impact and use of remittances

4.6.1. Household structures and relationships with remitters

The impact of remittances may be related to household structure, the relationship between the migrant and the household, as well as to their role within the household. The 2006 SAMP survey established a profile of 4,700 migrants from five countries. With the exception of Zimbabwe (56%) and Lesotho (83%), migrant flows are more than 85% male and migrants are mainly married or cohabit (72%). In Lesotho and Zimbabwe, where numbers of women migrants were sufficient to analyze the data, male migrants were more likely to be married than women (77% men and 36% of women in Lesotho and 62% of men and 54% of women in Zimbabwe). Women were more likely than men to be divorced, separated or abandoned (2% of men and 14% of women in Lesotho and 1% of men and 10% of women in Zimbabwe). Women were also more likely to be widowed (4% of men and 13% of women in Lesotho and 1% of men and 8% of women in Zimbabwe). This suggests that women are more likely to be beneficiaries of remittances than men. However, migrants that bring remittances home themselves may determine how and on whom the money is spent, so although women may benefit from the remittances they may not have much say in how they are spent.

It should be noted that sending remittances may affect the quality of life of the remitter in the destination country. Census 2001 indicates that SADC migrant households are least likely to own televisions, radios and refrigerators. That may be because they have been purchased in their home country, but also indicates that migrants may live materially restricted lives in their destination country in order to be able to send money home.

SAMP found that the remittances of the 4,700 migrants surveyed affected the lives of over 30,000 family members (on average 6.4 people per migrant). FinScope found that average household size in rural areas of Botswana was 5 and in urban areas 4. In Lesotho the figures were 5.5 in rural and 4.6 in urban areas; in Namibia 5.9 in rural and 5.1 in urban areas; and in Swaziland 6.7 in rural and 4.3 in urban areas.

Although the concept of household head is complicated to define, the SAMP survey results (see Table 20) indicate that for most countries in the survey the migrant, or remitter, is likely to be a male household head. The next most significant category was sons and daughters remitting to their parents, followed by siblings.

Bracking and Sachikonye in Zimbabwe found that by
far the most common relationships between recipient and remitter were son or daughter to parent, or parent to son or daughter. The second most popular relationship is that of brother or sister. Remittances between spouses only rank third at 12%. This study also found that, of the recipient households, 36.2% receive remittances from more than one person, with 63% coming from a single migrant. Some 12.3% receive from three or more senders. Sumata also indicates that households in the DRC may receive remittances from more than one migrant in more than one country, as migrant household members may go to different countries in order to minimize risk.

### Table 20 - Relationship of the remitting migrant to the household (% migrants)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Botswana (N=634)</th>
<th>Lesotho (N=1076)</th>
<th>Mozambique (N=998)</th>
<th>Swaziland (N=1133)</th>
<th>Zimbabwe (N=859)</th>
<th>Total (N=4700)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse/partner</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son/daughter</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother/sister</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.6.2. Importance of remittances to household incomes

Households in SADC countries usually require cash incomes to enable them to access basic services such as water, electricity, housing, education and medical care. Remittances make a significant contribution to household incomes in the region. With the exception of Botswana remittances in money comprised the most common income source for households in the SAMP survey, where only households with cross-border migrants were interviewed (see Table 21). High rates of remittance reflect the prevalence of circular migration in the region. This means that migrants retain strong links with their homes in the sending country where close family members are likely to remain. And, migration is often a household livelihood strategy rather than an individual one. The importance of remittances to the incomes of recipient households (see Table 21) may also reflect difficulties in accessing cash incomes for households in the sending country. Country differences in income from other sources reflect employment and other income earning opportunities, or lack thereof.

### Table 21 - Sources of household income (% households)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Botswana</th>
<th>Lesotho</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Swaziland</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage work</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual work</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash remittances</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods remittances</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income farm products</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income formal business</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income informal business</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SAMP found that when annual mean household income from different sources is compared, income from wage employment and cash remittances were equal at R4,800, but exceeded median incomes from business (R2,400), pensions (R2,038), casual work (R1,200) and goods remitted (R911). Overall, the survey found that when median total incomes are compared with median incomes from remittances, with the exception

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96. Wade Pendleton et al., ‘Migrant remittances…’, p. 17.
97. Claude Sumata, ‘Migradollars & poverty…’
98. Wade Pendleton et al., ‘Migrant remittances…’, p. 28. This table includes households with cross-border migrants (not internal migrants). It is showing the importance of remittance incomes to households rather than remittance behaviour. The high rate of remittance reflects the prevalence of circular migration in the region, i.e. migrants retain strong links with their homes in the sending country.
of Botswana (where they are still a third of total median annual income), remittances make a significant contribution to household incomes. Table 22 also shows that for most countries the annual incomes of remittance recipient households are low.

**Table 22 - Annual median household income (all sources) & median remittance incomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Median Household Income (ZAR)</th>
<th>Median Remittance Income (ZAR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall income</td>
<td>30,226</td>
<td>9,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash remittances</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods remittances</td>
<td>3,017</td>
<td>1,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland (ZAR)</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe (ZAR)</td>
<td>3,151</td>
<td>1,093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.6.3 Impact and use of remittances

Although research indicates that the incomes of remittance recipient households are small, it also shows that remittances comprise a significant proportion of cash income. Remittance research is often concerned with whether remittances are utilized for productive activities. Existing research in SADC countries shows that remittances are more important in enabling households to meet basic needs and buy basic services.

SAMP found that the overwhelming number of households (93%), purchase food and other basic goods with remitted funds. The purchase of these basic goods accounts for two to six times more than any other category of expenditure. Some 43% of households spend remitted monies on transportation and the same amount spent money on fuel. A similar number (38%) spend money on utilities, whilst 31% spend money on education and a further 30% spend remitted monies on medical expenses. Countries show differentiated patterns of expenditure and priorities. Education expenditure (mostly school fees) ranks highest in Zimbabwe (57%) and Mozambique (44%). Medical expenditure is important in Zimbabwe (40%), Swaziland (39%) and Mozambique (31%). Counter-intuitively, savings of remitted monies remains more important for Zimbabweans than any other country, despite quadruple-digit inflation. Only Swaziland households invest remitted funds heavily in agriculture, whilst Mozambicans remit and invest more in building materials than any other country.

Significantly, the SAMP research provides very little evidence of re-investment of income in entrepreneurial or other income-generating activities. Furthermore, there is little evidence of savings in households that receive remittances. To the contrary, 69% of Basotho households report borrowing money throughout the year, with between 42% and 49% of other country households reporting borrowing throughout the year.

The SAMP study concludes that, whilst migration is an important poverty alleviation strategy in the region, there is little evidence of the developmental value of remittances in the region in the form of generating new economic activities. However, enabling children to access education and people to access medical care does contribute to human development and security. At the same time, remittances contribute to national incomes for service delivery as people pay for education, health, electricity, water and other services provided by the state.

SAMP also found that remittances lifted many households above the poverty line. The median income of remittance recipient households was above the median found in Afrobarometer surveys, and remittance recipient households were less likely to report going hungry. Bracking and Sachikonye demonstrate the importance of remittances to recipient households in Zimbabwe. Some 9% of the sampled households indicated that remitted food is essential for their survival and 97% of respondents stated that remittances are something they could not do without. A mere 17% of respondents stated that they received other forms of social protection. Of these, 41% received money from the church, 16% from the government and 10% from a Zimbabwean charity. The overwhelming majority of respondents

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100. Wade Pendleton et al., 'Migrant remittances...', p. 28.
101. Wade Pendleton et al., 'Migrant remittances...', p. 28.
Fion de Vletter, ‘Migration and poverty…’ contend that they are not receiving more now than they have historically, largely due to domestic hyper-inflation. Some 72% of respondents stated that times were harder and their needs greater than in the past.

After changing remitted money into local currency, most often through local money changers, 70% utilize the remittance to buy food, although the most common single category of usage was that of paying monthly bills followed by school fees. Notionally, ‘investment’ items such as fertilizer or seed account for 13% of expenditure.

Also in Zimbabwe, Maphosa found 98% of households use cash remittances to buy food. Whilst the purchase of food is the most frequent use of remittances, he notes that a wide range of other goods are purchased, primarily building materials and consumer goods. In addition to the building of houses, bicycles are purchased for use in running errands and for children to ride to school. ‘Scotch carts’ (donkey-drawn carts) are frequently made or purchased with remitted cash and are used for transporting goods, fetching water, firewood and are also used as ambulances and hearses. The study established that migrants kept their cars in South Africa and only brought them back when they returned on holiday. However, Maphosa contends that cash remittances are seldom invested directly into economically-productive activities. Nevertheless there is evidence that migrants own and ‘run’ general dealerships, carpentry workshops, grinding mills and liquor outlets, all supported by their cash remittances. The study further shows that there is little evidence of direct investment into the community from remittances, despite instances of ad hoc philanthropy.

A survey of the relationships between migration and poverty in Mozambique established a significant indicator of regional wealth differentiation in that the materials used in the construction of houses in the South (the main migrant sending area) was superior to those used in the Central and Northern regions.102 Households in the South invest far more, with over 50% of male-headed households investing US$40 or more per annum. The figure for female-headed households is lower, though in the same regional proportion. The reason that female-headed households invest less may be that female-headed households are more likely to be widows or single parents and thus without the benefit of a second breadwinner. More than a third (36%) of all female-headed households fall into the lowest quartile, yet there is a similar chance (22%) that female-headed households will make it into the highest quartile of income (25%).

Although not disaggregated by sex, Tables 24 and 25 clearly illustrate the significance of remittances, both in terms of frequency and in quantum, for households in the Mozambican survey.

102. Fion de Vletter, ‘Migration and poverty…’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quartiles</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Quartile (lowest)</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Quartile</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Quartile</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Quartile (highest)</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANE
Table 24 – Household income from all sources (by frequency)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Income</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>% of households</th>
<th>% of responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage work</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual work</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances - money</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances – goods</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from farm products</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from formal business</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from informal business</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension/disability</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused to answer</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1791</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MARS

Table 25 – Household income by source and value

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Income</th>
<th>Valid N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage work</td>
<td>N=149</td>
<td>$1,016</td>
<td>$608.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual work</td>
<td>N=44</td>
<td>$226.67</td>
<td>$65.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances - money</td>
<td>N=438</td>
<td>$523.99</td>
<td>$347.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances – goods</td>
<td>N=266</td>
<td>$393.79</td>
<td>$217.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from farm products</td>
<td>N=115</td>
<td>$103.84</td>
<td>$39.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from formal business</td>
<td>N=8</td>
<td>$779.89</td>
<td>$391.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from informal business</td>
<td>N=84</td>
<td>$255.72</td>
<td>$130.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension/disability</td>
<td>N=15</td>
<td>$263.45</td>
<td>$86.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts</td>
<td>N=12</td>
<td>$60.94</td>
<td>$26.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other income</td>
<td>N=11</td>
<td>$226.48</td>
<td>$52.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total income</td>
<td>N=579</td>
<td>$936.91</td>
<td>$528.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MARS

As in other country studies, remittances are most often used to purchase food, followed by fuel, transportation expenses and then education. The largest average individual expenditure in Mozambique however was on building activities, though 78% of respondents regarded remittances to be ‘very important’ for food, followed by cattle purchases, school fees, clothing, transport costs and vehicles and then medical expenses.

Despite the high level of dependence on remittances, recipient households in Mozambique still tend to fall into debt and are forced to borrow money (42% of households in the previous year). Alarmingly, the most frequent reason for borrowing was to purchase food, followed by health reasons and funerals. The study does not clarify whether borrowing patterns are correlated to the frequency or amount of remittance, but it is felt that households are more likely to borrow where the remittance is period is infrequent. This is supported by data indicating that infrequency of remittance correlates with a lower quantum of remittance. Furthermore, migrants are frequently unable to respond directly to household emergency needs and 42% of households felt that they could not rely on the migrant to respond in a time of need.

While the argument that remittances have translated into a higher standard of living holds true for the South, the overall poverty of the households in the survey is alarming. 25% of households are categorized as relatively poor with 22% deemed extremely poor. More particularly, 24% of households go ‘many times’ without food and 33% go many times without cash. The latter may reflect the lower frequency at which Mozambican miners return home.

Chipeta and Kachaka in Malawi found that whilst remittances are not the main source of income for the poor, they were significant and received by some 20.3% of Malawi poor households and 20.2% of ultra-poor households in 1998.

households is region-specific, with the Northern region being more dependent (35.4%), followed by the South (9%) and the Central region (7.7%). Remittances represent a greater percentage of income in rural than in urban areas.

The study used simple regression analysis to establish whether or not remittances were counter-cyclical with respect to the Malawian economy. Simply put, do Malawian remittances cushion the impact of economic downturns on the poor? Given the sharp, cyclical swings characteristic of the Malawian economy, particularly those driven by climatic shifts and agricultural performance, this is a crucial question. The study concludes that remittances tend to be counter-cyclical and have a measured impact on ameliorating poverty during Malawian domestic economic downturns. However, the potentially complicating variable is that the value of remittances from South Africa to Malawi is directly correlated to the performance of the South African economy. The influence of internal and external remittances on poverty levels in Malawi is significant is demonstrated in Table 26.104

### Table 26 – Descriptive analysis of effect of remittances on poverty by household remittance status (Malawi, 1998 – N=6586)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remittance Status</th>
<th>Poverty Headcount (%)</th>
<th>Poverty Gap (%)</th>
<th>Squared Poverty Gap (%)</th>
<th>Mean Household Income (Including Remittances) (MK)</th>
<th>Per Capita Household Expenditure (Excluding Remittances) (MK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household received remittances</td>
<td>55.07</td>
<td>51.74</td>
<td>-3.33</td>
<td>10772.12</td>
<td>5535.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household received remittances</td>
<td>20.89</td>
<td>19.11</td>
<td>-1.77</td>
<td>9950.90</td>
<td>5508.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change (No remittances vs. remittances)</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
<td>2.408</td>
<td>-0.372</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the majority of remittance recipient households in the region are poor, they would be even poorer without the income from remittances. That many do not use remittances for what are considered developmental uses, i.e. to support productive income-generating activities does not mean that they do not have a developmental impact. Being able to access basic services like water, housing, electricity, education, health care, transport etc. contributes to the human security and development of recipient household members. While there is no evidence to show that remittances are used collectively in recipient communities for common services or goods, this does not mean that they do not have a positive impact on recipient communities.

Unfortunately these studies are limited in that they have not explored the gendered aspects of migration and remittance processes, either in terms of sending or receipt of remittances. Gender roles and relations affect employment and income-earning opportunities for both male and female migrants and, as a result, the amount they can remit, how they choose to remit, how often they can return home or remit money. Household gender relations also affect decision-making processes in households with regard to who will migrate and how remittance resources are utilized, allocated and distributed among members of the household.

### 4.7. Role of remittances at a regional level

One of the aims of SADC is to improve regional cooperation to encourage development and reduce poverty. Migration and remittance behaviour are a key facet of this regional integration, as they create links, including economic and social ties, between countries. Notwithstanding what should be the eventual introduction of the Facilitation of Movement of Persons Protocol, migration policy, legislation and data-gathering remain fragmented. Even when the Protocol has been ratified and applied, national migration legislation will still govern the movement of labour migrants, even though the Protocol emphasizes the advantages of harmonization and cooperation. Furthermore, the Protocol provides few measures which will impact the gendered dimensions of migration and ameliorate the situation
of vulnerable women migrants. The regional context within which migration and remittance behaviour takes place, while not actively hostile, does not enhance the development possibilities of migration and remittances.

Although migration has a largely beneficial impact on SADC as a whole and on regional cooperation, development and poverty alleviation in particular, it also generates some conflict. Areas of possible conflict of interests relate to the migration of skilled workers. If countries within the region actively pursue skills from other SADC countries, or become significant recipients of skilled migrant labour, it could cause conflict with those countries that suffer the effects of brain drain. Deportation and repatriation procedures have led to prolonged and not always friendly discussions between South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Granting of asylum may also cause problems between countries. While the provision of asylum to people fleeing war-torn countries is less problematic, the current ambiguous but highly unstable situation in Zimbabwe has the potential to cause inter-state hostility when other SADC countries grant asylum to Zimbabweans. In the case of the DRC, hosting refugees from Rwanda is also fueling conflict in the eastern part of the region.

4.8. Role of remittances at a national level

At a national level, SADC governments, despite the importance of migration and remittances, appear to have made little attempt to facilitate them or enhance their development impact. There is no evidence that national governments account for cross-border migration (in or out of the country) in development planning, and poverty-reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) are notably silent on the subject. Nevertheless, migration cuts across most areas of concern to governments and international development/financial organizations. With the exception of compulsory deferred pay, national data on the volume of remittances are not provided by governments, and with the exception of Lesotho and Swaziland it seems that they are not published and possibly not even gathered. As shown above, where national data are available, remittances make a significant contribution to the national economies of recipient countries. In the cases of Lesotho and Mozambique, compulsory deferred pay also makes a significant contribution to foreign exchange reserves.

Migration and remittances affect:

- **Investment in education**: Loss of skills, even artisanal, through out-migration represents a loss of investment in education. Similarly, countries that can attract skilled migrants benefit from skills and training that they have not financed.

- **Service delivery**: Both in- and out-migration affect the demand for public services. Out-migration of skilled professionals affects the ability of governments to adequately provide services, particularly health and education. When remittances are used to pay for education and health care, as shown earlier in the discussion of remittances in SADC, then benefits accrue to the State through the development of its population and because services are no longer publicly-funded. As most migrants return to their countries of origin when they become sick, disabled or retire, either these countries or the migrant-sending households bear the costs of caring for them without the benefit of their labour or taxes.

- **Remittance recipient countries**: Remittance recipient countries benefit from the investments made by migrant-sending households, even if it is just to reduce levels of poverty and improve household well-being through increased levels of consumption. Further developmental benefits can be seen when remittances are used to finance productive activities in recipient countries.

- **Labour force**: Out-migration means that countries of origin lose productive labour capacity. However, when unemployment levels are high, as in most SADC countries, out-migration can also reduce pressure from unemployment. Migration can create pressure on labour markets in destination countries, and possibly depress wages and working conditions. However, in-migration can also fill gaps in the labour markets of destination countries, particularly in terms of skilled labour, and therefore facilitate national development.

• Food security: Evidence presented above shows that remittances improve the food security of poor remittance recipient households. Food is the most common item on which remittances are spent and also comprises some of the various goods that are remitted in addition to is still unclear from available research. Migrant labour also contributes to productive activities in commercial agriculture in destination countries.

While remittances generally have a positive effect for recipient countries, as the experience of Lesotho shows, changes in the economy and labour market can have dire consequences in a country that is highly dependent on migrant remittances. In the case of Lesotho, retrenchments in the mining sector in South Africa disrupted patterns of migration terminated remittance flows, with significant negative effects on the economy and development of the country.
5. AFRICAN, SADC AND NATIONAL MIGRATION POLICIES

5.1. African migration policy

Free movement of people is one of the aims laid out in the founding treaty of the African Union (AU), however, migration was largely absent from the agenda of the organization until recent years. Although, in 1969, AU (then the OAU) Member States ratified a convention on the protection of refugees which, while based on the 1951 UN convention, extends the grounds on which asylum can be sought to better reflect African conditions. Recent attention to migration has led to the development of a strategic framework on migration. Building on the OAU Council of Ministers Decision CM/Dec 614 (LXXIV) the 74th Ordinary Session in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001 resolved to formulate a Framework for a Policy on Migration in Africa for consideration by African Heads of State. By June 2006 the Executive Council of the African Union had developed a Strategic Framework for Migration Policy in Africa, which includes the following recognition,

It is clearly known that well-managed migration has the potential to yield significant benefits to origin and destination States. For instance labour migration has played an important role in filling labour needs in agriculture, construction and other sectors, thus contributing to economic development of many destination countries in Africa. Conversely, the beneficial feed-back effects of migration such as remittances, knowledge and skills transfers, and return migration have in some cases made major contributions to economies of origin countries. However, mismanaged or unmanaged migration can have serious negative consequences for States’ and migrants’ well-being, including potential destabilizing effects on national and regional security, and jeopardizing inter-State relations. Mismanaged migration can also lead to tensions between host communities and migrants, and give rise to xenophobia, discrimination and other social pathologies. The realities of migration in Africa, including its increasing importance and untapped potential, underscore the need for States to develop comprehensive policies on migration. Such efforts will require enhanced dialogue on sub-regional, regional and pan-African levels.

The Migration Policy Framework identifies nine key thematic migration issues with corresponding sub-themes and makes policy recommendations for consideration by AU Member States and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as the SADC. It provides comprehensive and integrated policy guidelines and recommendations for action on the following thematic issues: a) Labour migration; b) Border Management; c) Irregular Migration; d) Forced Displacement; e) Human Rights of Migrants; f) Internal Migration; g) Migration Data; h) Migration and Development; and i) Inter-State Co-operation and Partnerships. The Framework also highlights other social ramifications of migration in areas such as health, environment, gender, conflict etc.

The Framework aims to provide the necessary guidelines and principles to assist governments and their RECs in the formulation of their own national and regional policies on migration, as well as their implementation in accordance with their own priorities and resources. It seeks to serve as a comprehensive and integrated reference document but is non-binding in nature, scope and content. Member States and RECs can borrow elements as they deem fit, appropriate and applicable to their country-specific or region-specific migration challenges and situations. It notes that since migration flows, patterns, volumes and dynamics vary amongst states and regions, the migration policy framework does not provide priorities or resource mobilization mechanisms for implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the recommended actions as these would be determined by states and regions according to their specific migration challenges, resources and competencies.

It goes on to note, however, that relevant UN Agencies and International Organizations, NGOs, CSOs and specialized agencies and institutions with migration expertise and competencies could provide the necessary technical assistance and support to governments and the RECs in resource mobilization for the implementation of the national or regional migration policies to complement efforts of governments and RECs.

At the level of institutional pan-Africanism, the AU is cognizant of the value and importance of migrant remittances for Africa, noting that their value far outstrips that of Official Development Assistance. Thus the Framework document outlines the following recommended strategies regarding remittances:
• Encourage the transfer of remittances by adopting sound macro-economic policies conducive to investment and growth and appropriate financial sector policies that encourage financial institutions and their outreach: post office networks, supporting credit unions, and rural financial service providers.

• Strengthen collaboration with relevant stakeholders in civil society, the donor community and financial sector to create incentive strategies and investment opportunities for remitters in commercial, entrepreneurial, savings and other productive activities.

• Improve the quality of data on remittances and migration to create a solid basis for future policy action on remittances.

• Promote the effective mobilization and utilization of diaspora funds for investment and development in the public and private sector to improve the macro-economic environment and reduce the emigration of African professionals from the continent.

The Framework also makes the following broad recommendations:

• The development of a common migration policy among African countries towards harmonization of laws, standards, procedures, information dissemination, statistics, documents, and efficient use of resources.

• Integrate migration and displacement issues into national and regional agendas for security and stability as well as development and co-operation.

• Develop modalities or action plans incorporating the relevant provisions of the Cairo Plan of Action adopted at the Africa-Europe Summit (Cairo, 3-4 April 2000); Article 13 on Migration of the EU-Platform on Future Relations between Africa and the EU (Follow-up to the Cairo Summit, Ouagadougou, 28 November 2002); the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; and the United Nations Convention Against Trans-national Organized Crime and its two additional Protocols (2000).

• Engage the European Commission in increased dialogue focusing on the relationship between migration and development in Africa within the context of the Africa-Europe Summit and the relations under the Cairo Plan of Action, for example by organizing fora with a wider range of actors in the development field, such as AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), UNDP, the World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank (ADB), WCO, WHO, ILO and IOM.

The Framework is a largely gender-blind document. However, recommendations regarding the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of all Migrant Workers and their Families indicate recognition of how the dynamics of migration within the continent compromise both men and women, and their families. The Framework acknowledges the growing feminization of migration in Africa and that women now constitute almost 50% of all migrants, and notes particularly the demand for female migrants in the services sector. Despite this, the question of women and migration receives only a paragraph in the Framework, which expresses concern about the vulnerability and exploitation of migrant women, but fails to address migration policies that exclude women who would choose to migrate autonomously. Women are thus largely portrayed as victims or corollaries of migration processes and not active agents. Despite this scant attention, the AU makes the following recommendations with respect to female migrants:

• Strengthen responses to the particular needs of migrant women, in particular ensuring that their health needs, labour rights and human rights are respected.

• Gender perspectives should be integrated in national and regional migration management policies and strategies.

• Take effective steps to counter migrant trafficking and smuggling, and other illegal practices which specifically target and victimize migrant women and ensure the adequate treatment, in the context of applicable human rights instruments, of women and children who are victims of trafficking and sexual slavery.

106. Only two countries in the SADC are signatories to the Convention.
• Promote informational/educational campaigns to raise awareness about gender dimensions of migration among policy makers and personnel involved in managing migration.

The Framework was followed up by an AU experts meeting in 2006 on Migration and Development. The objective was to develop ‘Elements for an African Common Position on Migration and Development.’ The document notes that whilst migration is an increasingly prominent feature of the political economies of many African countries, ‘...migratory flows are occurring in an African context still marked by the inadequacy of institutional capacities of African countries to address the problems and individually and collectively.’ Though the document makes a number of practical policy and process recommendations with respect to intra-African and regional migration, as well as developing a modus vivendi with the European Union, gender issues and the dynamics of African female migration are entirely absent.

5.2. SADC migration policy

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a 14-member regional body whose aim is to ensure the economic well-being and improve the quality of life, freedom, social justice and peace and security of the some 200 million people of the region. Founded in 1980 after the independence of Zimbabwe, it was originally known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). This was a relatively loose alignment of southern African states with the principle objectives of coordinating regional development policies and reducing the economic dependence of the so-called ‘Front-Line States’ on South Africa. Front-line states were not just those that were contiguous with South Africa, but also those in the region housing anti-apartheid activists and thus subjected to de-stabilization and incursions by South African security forces.

The SADC was formally constituted as a development community in 1992 upon signature of the declaration and treaty by the heads of state and government. South Africa was permitted to join SADC in 1994. Its founding treaty includes the aim of eventual free movement of people in the region. The original operating model for SADC provided that member states would be responsible for various areas related to the development and co-ordination of regional policy. The structure proved unwieldy and inefficient, so in 2001 the 21 coordinating units were streamlined into four clusters: i) Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; ii) Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; iii) Infrastructure and Services; and iv) Social and Human Development and Special Programmes. SADC migration issues fall under the latter cluster. Linked to the re-constituted and better-resourced SADC Secretariat are 14 SADC National Committees. These provide national input into the formulation of regional policies, strategies and the SADC Programme of Action and are tasked with overseeing the implementation of SADC programmes at the national level, including those relating to gender and migration.

At the level of regional migration policy, in March 1996 an SADC Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the Southern African Development Community was submitted to Member States. It aimed at establishing a regimen of free movement amongst the citizens of SADC countries within ten years. After resistance from South Africa, Botswana and Namibia (three of the main migrant destination countries) on the grounds that unequal economic development would lead to an effective ‘open door’ policy into their respective countries, the draft protocol was dropped. A protracted process of negotiation and neglect followed.

A watered down SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of People with the central objective of the ‘development of policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of persons in the Region generally into and within the territories of State Parties’, was signed by six heads of state at the Gaborone Summit in August 2005. It has subsequently been signed by the necessary nine signatories.

108. The member states are: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
for the Protocol to reach the next stage of implementation. However, each country now needs to ratify the Protocol through its national parliaments before planning for implementation can take place. Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, the original objectors, have all since signed.

The Protocol emphasizes the need for moves towards harmonization of migration policies and systems of migration management and data gathering; increased cooperation in migration management including in the areas of security, irregular migration and counter-trafficking measures; and the development of population registers. In the area of facilitating the movement of people, the only significant measure is that once the Protocol comes into effect, it will allow visa-free entry for SADC nationals visiting another SADC country for up to ninety days per year. All other forms of migration, i.e. immigration and temporary migration for the purposes of work, study and business, as well as what is called “settlement” will remain subject to national migration policies and legislation.

Significantly, the Protocol makes no reference to gender or the specificities of female migrants and migration, or any acknowledgement of their particular needs, challenges and conditions. While ostensibly gender-neutral, the Protocol does not challenge gendered provisions of national legislation, and the only provision of the Protocol directly relating to freeing movement of people in the region may in fact limit the movement of some. Many small-scale (or informal sector) cross-border traders, who overwhelmingly travel as visitors, spend more than ninety days a year in other SADC countries. In southern Africa this trade provides an income-earning opportunity for a significant number of women who, like their male counterparts, are disproportionately likely to be negatively affected by the Protocol.\(^{111}\)

Another body within SADC ostensibly addressing migration issues is the Southern African Minister’s Conference on Population and Development (SAMCPD), the coordinating body for government agencies dealing with population issues. The SAMCPD acknowledged migration as a priority issue as part of the establishment of the South African Forum for Population and Development (SAFPD) in 1999. SAFPD was mandated with promoting research into the causes of international migration within SADC and later passed a resolution that, ‘Members States should attempt to establish the relationship between demographic parameters, poverty and migration’ and in particular to ‘the influence of push factors on rural-to-urban migration and its relation to poverty and gender.’\(^{112}\) Yet for all the promising rhetoric, few SAMCPD country reports give priority to migration issues. Migration data remain patchy in most SADC countries and member countries tend to work in isolation from each other despite belonging to the umbrella SAMCPD. The 2004 SAMCPD country reports for Namibia, Zambia and Malawi do not even mention migration by name or as a sub-set of their population development analysis.

### 5.3. SADC and gender policy

Although individual national gender initiatives preceded its founding, the SADC Gender Unit was established in 1996, a year after the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China which gave impetus to the creation of the Unit. The SADC Council of Ministers gave approval for the establishment of a policy framework for mainstreaming gender in all SADC activities. The institutional framework for gender mainstreaming in SADC has three components:

1. A standing committee of Ministers responsible for gender and women’s affairs in SADC.
2. The incorporation of the Regional Advisory Committee (comprising one government and one NGO representative from each SADC country) to advise the Standing Committee on gender issues.
3. The establishment of Gender Focal Points to ensure gender is accounted for in all sectoral initiatives and ministerial meetings.


\(^{111}\) A recent SAMP survey monitoring 85,000 traders traveling through 20 SADC border posts found 41% were women. However, women traders comprised 80% of traders crossing at Livingstone, 71% at Lebombo and Namaacha, 67% at Chirundu, 63% at Mutare, and over 54% at Beit Bridge. See Sally Peberdy, ‘Shopping and trading: small scale cross-border entrepreneurship in southern Africa’, Tradewinds, forthcoming.

The Unit is housed within the SADC Secretariat and plays an extensive advisory role, but is also tasked with providing strategic input and guidance on gender mainstreaming and empowerment to Member States as well as regionally. Key amongst these tasks is to promote the "the full and equal participation of women and men in all decision-making processes at all levels through gender analysis to identify access variations and differential impacts on women and men of all projects, programme and policies."

The roles of the Unit include facilitation, co-ordination and monitoring of the implementation of SADC gender commitments at national and regional levels. The Unit is also responsible for the development and application of skills in gender analysis and gender mainstreaming in policy and programme/project development, review, planning and budgeting. The six priority areas of the SADC Gender Programme as stipulated by the overarching Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan are:

- Policy development and harmonization
- Gender mainstreaming
- Institutional strengthening and capacity building
- Women’s empowerment programmes including; women’s human rights, women and girl child education, violence against women and children, sexual and reproductive health and rights including HIV/AIDS, women’s economic empowerment, media and information; and women in politics and decision-making
- Communication, information-sharing and networking
- Monitoring and evaluation

A year after the founding of the SADC Gender Unit, the Gender and Development Declaration was signed at the SADC Summit (1997). The Declaration signed by all SADC Heads of State commits countries to:

- Repealing and reforming all laws, amending constitutions and changing social practices which still subject women to discrimination;
- Taking urgent measures to prevent and deal with the increasing levels of violence against women and children

A 2005 audit commissioned by the SADC Gender Unit and the SADC Parliamentary Forum of degree of achievement of the objectives of the Gender and Development Declaration revealed at best a mixed picture. The key findings included:

- Only two parliaments, Mozambique and South Africa, had reached the 30% female parliamentary representation threshold. The average female parliamentary representation in SADC hovers between 17.5% and 20%.
- Laws, systems and services for addressing gender-based violence remain inadequate and ‘new’ forms of gender-based violence such as trafficking are increasing.
- In most SADC countries there are contradictions between codified law and traditional law that are not adequately addressed constitutionally
- Women and especially young women exhibit higher HIV/AIDS infections rates, which adds considerably to their already unequal burden of care-giving
- Poverty is increasing in most SADC countries and has a ‘feminine face’
- There has been some progress in challenging gender stereotypes, but progress in this regard is far from satisfactory

The audit goes on to note:

Effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation of gender policies, programmes and activities continue to elude those charged with the responsibility of accounting to the public as the gap between policy and practice seems to widen ... The single greatest challenge identified in the audit is to move the SADC region from an era of commitments to an era of implementation.

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To this end, the audit recommended the adoption by the Heads of Government and State of an SADC Protocol to Accelerate Gender Equality. The proposal to develop a Gender Protocol was subsequently accepted in 2005, endorsed by the 2006 SADC Summit and is scheduled for finalization at the 2007 SADC Summit in Lusaka, Zambia. If adopted it will have taken SADC some 15 years to develop and adopt a protocol on gender equality.

### 5.4 National migration, refugee and citizenship policies

Migration in SADC is governed by national migration and refugee legislation and policies, and will largely continue to be so, even after the implementation of the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of People. As Manicom argues, men and women are “defined and constructed within the particular discourses and practices of ruling.” By this she means “commission reports, parliamentary debates...laws” and administrative procedures and practices. As she argues, “the very fundamental categories of state and politics - like citizen, worker, the modern state itself - are shot through with gender; they were in fact historically constructed and reproduced as masculine categories.” To this could be added the categories of immigrant, migrant and even refugee. South Africa is the only country in SADC which recognizes same-sex relationships in the granting of migration permits, or in the granting of refugee status for those fleeing persecution on the grounds of sexual-orientation.

While ostensibly gender-blind, migration legislation can impose conditions which are not gender-neutral. As Dodson argues,

> Migration policy must (similarly) be conceptualized in household terms, paying attention to the gender of the individual as well as to their household position and family status. Migrants are not only ‘labour units’ and ‘entrepreneurs’, but husbands, wives, sons and daughters. All migration, even when it is primarily economically motivated, takes place within a social context, with gender and family relations among the key factors influencing migration behaviour.

Klaaren and Rutinwa in a review of southern African migration, refugee and citizenship legislation indicate some areas of national legislation in the region which, while gender-blind, may not be gender neutral in their effects. These include:

- National migration legislation in SADC (as in most of the rest of the world) largely excludes non-national unskilled and semi-skilled workers from taking up employment. For reasons related to gender-bias in education, training and employment women are more likely to fall into this category of worker.
- Many countries have permits that allow the families of migrants to join them, and which are most likely to be used by women. However, these can impose work restrictions. In other countries, for instance South Africa, temporary residence permits do not make provision for family migration.
- Although the class of “other” employment exists, some countries (Swaziland and Tanzania) lay out specific sectors in which work permits should be issued, particularly agriculture, mining, trade, manufacturing or profession. All areas of employment which tend to be male-dominated.
- Provisions and regulations may also disproportionately disadvantage women migrants. South African immigration legislation, for example, requires that a person granted permanent residence on spousal grounds remain in the relationship for five years before permanent residence is finalized. This could impose difficulties for a woman (or man) who finds themselves in an abusive relationship.
- Malawian legislation requires male migrants to get permission before leaving the country for employment.
- South Africa and Mauritius both use contract workers, which only allow the worker to enter. In the case of South Africa these contract workers fall under bilateral agreements with Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland for the mining industry and ostensibly therefore privilege the entry of male migrants. In Mauritius contract workers are recruited to the textile/clothing sector and favour...
women over men.

- While the provisions of bilateral agreements between some countries (e.g., South Africa-Mozambique) may limit the activities of small-scale cross-border traders who are likely to be women, other agreements (e.g., Mozambique-Swaziland, DRC-Zambia, Angola-Namibia) facilitate the movement of small-scale cross-border traders.

National refugee legislation in SADC is based on the 1951 UN and 1967 AU Conventions on the Protection of Refugees. Botswana is the only country which is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention. Mauritius sends refugees to third countries through the UNHCR. South Africa only recognized refugees in 1994 (under immigration legislation), and its first ever Refugee Act was passed in 1998 and came into force in 2000. In most countries (e.g., Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia), refugees are encouraged to, and may have to, live in refugee camps. South Africa is one of the few countries that does not provide a camp option. While camps can provide protection for women, they can also be places of extreme insecurity.

Citizenship legislation in the region also exhibits gender bias. However, Tanzania is the only country that limits citizenship through jus sanguinis through the father. In some countries (Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) the granting of citizenship through marriage disadvantages men as only women can gain citizenship through marriage.
It is difficult to discuss migration in SADC without referring to HIV/AIDS. Southern Africa has the highest rates of HIV-infection in the world. UNDP estimates of HIV prevalence indicate rates of almost 40% in Botswana and Swaziland, around 25% in Zimbabwe and over 20% in South Africa. Malawi (14%) and Mozambique (12%) show lower rates of infection. High rates of infection in the region are associated with poverty, economic marginalization, and prevalence of other sexually transmitted infections, as well as mobility. Mobility can generate social and economic conditions that increase the vulnerability of migrants and non-migrants, particularly where circular migration is common. Women are more vulnerable than men to HIV-infection for reasons including biology, sexual violence, pressure for poor women to use sex for financial or other gain and difficulties negotiating condom use with partners. The linkage between the HIV/AIDS pandemic and migration in the region is receiving increasing scholarly and policy attention, but remains acutely under-researched. However, research has focused overwhelmingly on male migrants and mobile workers.

There are four main ways in which migration is tied to the transmission of HIV:

- There is a higher rate of infection in 'migrant communities,' which are often socially, economically and politically marginalized.
- Migrants’ multi-local social networks create opportunities for wider sexual networking.
- Mobility can encourage or make people vulnerable to high-risk sexual behaviour.
- Mobility makes people more difficult to reach through interventions, whether for preventive education, condom-provision, HIV testing and counseling, or post-infection treatment and care.

In drawing attention to connections between HIV and AIDS and migration, migrants should not be stigmatized or seen as agents of the virus. HIV is now endemic in southern Africa among migrants and non-migrants. However, the relationships between migration and HIV need to be explored in order that education, prevention and treatment interventions reach both migrants and non-migrants and address their realities.

Different forms of migration lead to different forms of vulnerability to infection. Where single-sex labour migration is regularized and formalized, as in South African mines, migrant communities have developed that include for many workers the formation of 'second' relationships and the use of sex-workers. Other forms of mobility disrupt or prevent the formation of stable place-based relationships. People who have multiple homes, or who spend a lot of time away from or between homes, may be more likely to engage in short-term relationships, whether economic, social or sexual, encouraging high-risk sexual behaviour. As Lurie shows, partners who are 'left behind,' who are usually women, may also engage in short- and long-term relationships while their partner is absent. These may be for financial support, but also for companionship and sexual satisfaction. Partners in these secondary relationships may themselves be migrant or transient workers.

Research examining these relationships outside the mining sector is relatively limited. However, recent research examining the vulnerability and access to health care of migrant male construction workers and female domestic workers in Johannesburg and female cross-border traders across five SADC countries (Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe) provides some insights into the vulnerability of migrants in these sectors.

The surveys undertaken in Johannesburg suggest that although construction workers use sex workers and have short-term relationships, these relationships are not as common as might be thought. In part this could
be because they earn extremely low incomes, limiting their opportunities to develop relationships with women and pay for sex. On the one hand, ‘live-in’ domestic workers appear to be protected by the restrictions their working lives place on their social lives, but on the other hand they are vulnerable when it comes to their partners, as they have no control over what they do while they are away. Although they reported incidences of rape and sexual assault, these were not higher than for other women in South Africa. Female cross-border traders, although they possess the opportunity to have secondary relationships, are protected by their work as they seemed to be more concerned with taking care of their businesses than engaging in secondary relationships while away from home. Reasons given for having secondary relationships varied: Construction workers said for sexual satisfaction (92%), financial support (4%) and emotional support (17%); whereas traders said they did so for financial support (28%) and somewhere to stay (4.7%), sexual satisfaction (21%) and emotional support (20%).

The most disturbing aspect of this research was not necessarily related to migration, but shows that levels of knowledge around HIV and AIDS are uneven in SADC, with traders from Malawi and Mozambique showing worryingly low levels of awareness. It may also, however, be related to being mobile, as in the study of domestic workers non-migrant women showed higher levels of knowledge and experience of HIV/AIDS than migrant workers.

Levels of condom use were extremely low and were also erratic. Over 60% of the women in the domestic workers survey had never used a condom in their lives. This compares to 40% of construction workers and female cross-border traders. However, traders showed significant country differences. Only 8% of Batswana women had never used a condom compared to 38% of Zimbabweans, 43% of Malawians and 62% of Mozambicans. These differences may reflect different gender relations, education levels, access to condoms and knowledge of HIV and AIDS.

HIV and AIDS may also influence and change patterns of mobility.

- People with HIV and AIDS commonly return to live with family members to obtain care. This might entail moving from an urban, back to a rural area or from one country back to another (e.g. South Africa to Lesotho). Others migrate in order to provide care to family members living elsewhere. Women are most likely to bear the load of caring for sick family members and orphaned children.
- People with AIDS-related opportunistic infections may migrate to obtain medical attention. This can involve cross-border movement to a country perceived to have better health care facilities.
- Loss of a household’s income though death or debilitation of a former migrant worker encourages migration by other household members to seek income-earning opportunities.
- Death or debilitation of household or community members can lead to a decline in agricultural productivity and food security, thus contributing to pressure for out-migration by remaining members.
- High rates of death or debilitation in particular labour sectors (e.g. in the South African mining sector) create the need to replace the workforce with new migrant workers.
- HIV and AIDS disproportionately affect the most economically-productive strata of society in many African countries. Skills gaps and shortages can ensue, leading countries to seek replacement skills from other countries.
- New widows or widowers (themselves often HIV-positive) may migrate upon the death of their partner. The tradition of levirate marriage in some African societies means that a widow becomes the wife of her late husband’s brother, which may require her relocation. In some places, the death of a husband can lead to a wife losing rights to land and thus livelihood, forcing her to move elsewhere to seek a living.
- AIDS orphans (who may themselves be HIV-positive) migrate to live with relatives or to seek their own income-earning opportunities.

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126. Sally Peberdy et al., ‘Building risk...’; Sally Peberdy et al., "Female informal sector..."
127. Sally Peberdy et al., "Female informal sector..."
128. Sally Peberdy and Natalya Dinat, ‘Migration and domestic workers...’
129. Jonathan Crush and Brian Williams, ‘Spaces of vulnerability...’
• People diagnosed HIV-positive or displaying physical symptoms of AIDS may migrate to escape stigmatization by their community.

HIV and AIDS may also affect certain forms of migration. Grandparents have traditionally been important as carers of the children of migrant workers. The loss of adults to AIDS may mean that there will be no grandparents to care for the next generation of children. HIV and AIDS may create new reasons to migrate, but could also make migration harder to sustain.

As anti-retroviral treatment (ART) is rolled out across the region, consideration needs to be given to migrant workers who are involved in circular and contract migration (for example mineworkers) and support provided so that they can maintain their course of ART when they return to their home countries, and when they migrate.

Remittances may play an important role in the relationship between migration and HIV and AIDS. Remittances help to tie migrants to their households and indicate a commitment to them and to maintaining relationships. Received remittances may inhibit spouses who have been left behind from engaging in secondary relationships for emotional or financial support. Where households have members who are HIV-positive remittances provide resources which may enable them to maintain health through good nutrition and access to ART and other medical care when necessary.
In conclusion, this paper demonstrates the importance of migration and remittances to households in SADC. However, it also shows that no single extant study successfully or satisfactorily examines or explains the linkages between gender, migrancy, remittances and development in or between SADC countries. However, this paper suggests that most of the individual elements for such research are already in place. Thus any satisfactory or heuristic research into female migrant remittances and development in SADC will need to be framed with this specific research question in mind. Utilizing the UN-INSTRAW research tool and methodology as a guiding framework, the definition of an appropriate methodological research framework for female migrants, remittances and development in SADC is the final task of the current UN-INSTRAW/SAIIA research programme.

The central purpose of this research was to serve as a scoping exercise to establish the breadth, depth and level of current research into female migrant remittances and development in SADC, and in so doing, identify the gaps in current research. Furthermore, this was to be conducted against the backdrop of UN-INSTRAW’s recently completed research into female migrants from the Dominican Republic and remittances. The latter study examined a number of important gender dynamics with respect to migration and female migrants in particular.

The research presented in this paper both straddles and yet falls between at least six themes of research within the SADC region, namely: migration, female migration, remittances, the developmental impact of remittances, and the gender dynamics of these patterns, flows and relationships. In the process of exploring the issues and relationships between gender, migration, remittances and development in SADC using existing research and data provided by governments, a number of sometimes gaping holes in available data, research and analysis have become apparent.

Furthermore, the focus of most research on migration and remittances has focused on South Africa, is largely gender-blind and often ignores women’s migration altogether. In addition, although South Africa appears to be the focus of migration flows in the region, as this paper shows other SADC countries that are often considered only as countries of origin also host relatively substantial migrant populations. Therefore for these countries, research needs to be extended to not only examine out-migration and its impact on migrant-sending households, but also in-migration.

Not only are sex-disaggregated data needed, but time-sensitive data collection is also essential in order to show changes over time and assist in better understanding changes in the gender dynamics of migration flows. This should not only encompass migration flows themselves, but also structural changes in employment opportunities and household composition.

Future research will also need to take into account a host of policy, environmental and research uncertainties that relate to migration, gender, remittances and development in SADC. These include:

- The impact of the SADC Protocols on migration, trade, finance and gender;
- Continued economic and political crises in Zimbabwe;
- HIV and AIDS;
- The conditionalities of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) on six SADC countries that qualify for the programme. Associated PRSPs necessitate reduction in state sector employment levels and privatization of entities and services. These policies in practice lead to retrenchments, down-sizing, and normalization of jobs in sectors often populated by female professionals and skilled workers.

Many of the gaps identified below refer to national quantifiable data. However, in order to fill many of these gaps in existing research and information and undertake gendered analyses, qualitative research involving in-depth nuanced interviews and focus groups with migrants, migrant-sending households, and migrant-sending and recipient communities will be necessary.
1. National sex-disaggregated data and analysis

To better understand the relationships between gender, migration and remittances in SADC it would be useful to have access to the following sex-disaggregated data on national and migrant populations, and if possible analyses of the gender relations underpinning this data:

- Sex and age structures of national populations
- Education levels
- Employment and unemployment patterns
- Relative incomes
- Access to formal sector financial services
- Access to basic services including type of housing, water source, electricity
- Access to material goods such as radios, telephones etc.
- Poverty profiles of the population

2. Household formation and dynamics

Household formation and dynamics (including decision-making processes) in countries of origin and destination shape migration and remittance patterns as well as their use and impact. It would be most useful if this information were available for non-migrant households in countries of origin and destination, migrant-sending households and migrant households in destination countries. As this research has shown significant differences between countries, the latter should also be explored by nationality.

- Household size and formation (i.e., extended, nuclear families etc.)
- Sex of heads of households
- Who makes decisions in households, and about what aspects of household activities and how do gender relations affect these processes
- Who is responsible for child care and how do these responsibilities affect migration
- Attitudes to, and prevalence of polygamous marriages
- Impact of HIV and AIDS on household formation

3. Migration patterns and flows

Although some information is available on migration patterns and flows there are some significant gaps in available information. Better understanding of who is going where would enable better estimation of remittance flows, the potential developmental impact of migration. Most official data on migration is not disaggregated by sex, but sex disaggregated data is necessary to facilitate gendered analyses. Census data may be of assistance as well as official data gathered by Departments responsible for migration. Access to unpublished data may be necessary

- Official data on:
  - Foreign-born populations by sex and age
  - Permanent residence permits issued
  - Temporary residence permits issued
  - Asylum-seekers and refugees
  - If possible, reliable estimates of undocumented migration
  - Who is going from which countries to where and how these patterns are affected by gender relations
  - Profiles of women migrants

4. Migration experiences

Better understanding of how gender affects migrant experiences could assist in exploring the impact of migration and development. Sex-disaggregated data would assist in developing a gendered analysis.

- Sectors of employment
- Income
- Household formation and its impact on migration decisions
- Who makes decisions to migrate and whether these are affected by gender relations
- Access to services in the host country including type of housing, water source, electricity
• Access to material goods such as radios, telephones etc.
• Experiences of sexual abuse and harassment

5. Impact of remittances on national economies

Existing research suggests that relatively little is known about the full extent of remittance flows in the region. Because the majority of remittances are sent informally, information on the amounts of remittances flowing through the region will need to be calculated based on unofficial data. However, governments should be encouraged to gather and provide information on remittance flows sent through informal channels. Better understanding of remittance flows at a national level would assist in planning for development and the implementation of plans to encourage remittances and enable migrants to make best use of them.

5. Remittance flows to households

Existing research on remittances has either not attempted to disaggregate data by sex, or has only identified a limited number of female migrants in the surveys, which has made it difficult to analyze data on female migrant remittances. More focused studies centering on women migrants and their remittance behaviour would be useful. However, in order to better understand their relationship to gender, it may be necessary to include male migrants in such studies. They should further explore how gender affects:
• Amounts and types of remittances sent
• Methods used to send remittances
• Access to banking services in the host country

6. Impact of remittances on recipient households

The impact and utilization of remittances may be affected by gender relations within the household as well as the sex of the person sending the remittances. Better understanding is needed of these dynamics as existing research has focused on how remittances are utilized, but not how gender relations may affect decision making processes, or who benefits in the household.

• Who makes decisions regarding the utilization of remittances
• Who benefits from remittances in the household
• Do gender relations affect the impact of remittances on households
• How are remittances utilized and what is their importance to the household, including levels of poverty and food security
• Contributions to productive activities and barriers to using remittances for such activities
• Whether the impacts of remittances are gendered
• Whether there are differences in the ways remittances are utilized and their importance depending on the sex of household heads and the remitter as well as the structure of the recipient household
• Access and use of formal and informal financial services.

7. Receipt of social protection

This paper has not discussed access to social protection measures, which migrant workers and their widows and widowers may be entitled to. These include pensions, disability grants and death benefits.

• Do migrant workers and their entitled dependents receive these social protection measures?
• How does gender affect access to these benefits, given that men tend to be more likely to be employed in sectors where social protection is available?
• What value are they to households?

8. Skilled or ‘brain drain’ migration

Skilled migration is of considerable concern to the region. It includes both migration from the region overseas as well as ‘brain circulation’ within the region. Evidence suggests that women comprise an increasing proportion of skilled migrants, particularly as they are likely to be employed in health and education, two areas in which there are global skills shortages. Further research is needed on the relationships between gender
and skilled intra- and extra-regional migration and its relationship to remittance behaviour.

9. HIV and AIDS

While a considerable body of research exists on the relationships between migration and HIV/AIDS, this has focused on male migrant workers. Most research has focused on the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of migrant workers and their partners. Further research is needed on:

- The vulnerability and knowledge of female migrant workers to HIV-infection
- The impact of HIV/AIDS on women as they are likely to bear the brunt of caring for people who are sick and orphans and other dependents
- How HIV/AIDS is affecting migration patterns
- How and whether migrants can access ART and maintain treatment programmes. To this could be added treatment for tuberculosis

10. National migration and legislation

Migrants in SADC have to negotiate their way through the requirements of national migration and refugee legislation. While ostensibly gender-blind, legislation is rarely gender-neutral in its impact. Although gendered analyses of the South African legislative environment have been made, gendered analyses are needed of migration regimes in other SADC countries, as they can have a significant opportunities afforded to male and female migrants and their families.

Research and methodological challenges

There are methodological difficulties in conducting research on and with the relatively ‘invisible’ female migrants in SADC. Given that the majority of female migrants in SADC work in domestic service and the agricultural sector and given the high levels of mobility (female migrants frequently traveling on public transport such as taxis and buses), simply identifying and conducting research with female migrants remains a practical challenge.

The accurate identification of female-headed households for interviewing and research purposes is also problematic given the patriarchy evident in many households in the SADC region. Even where a woman is the major or only breadwinner in the household, she may defer to a male and still not be regarded or regard herself as the household head. This is particularly problematic for research on remittances. Research on issues relating to money is sensitive, but particularly in the case of Zimbabweans is becoming increasingly difficult, particularly because the incentive to formalize remittances is relatively low.

With respect to the question of the developmental impact of remittances, methodologically this would require a comparative examination of households in SADC countries receiving remittances and those not. Other questions would pertain to whether the remittances were from internal migration rather than cross-border, or whether they were remittances from overseas countries. Clearly these questions have budgetary implications for the research too.

Research into the role of civil society in promoting, protecting and enhancing the rights of female migrants in SADC is recommended. In particular the need to examine ways in which research can assist government departments and agencies move from better intent to reality with respect to gender issues and the treatment of female migrants.

The role of migrant support networks requires more research and in particular the role of remittances in sustaining, changing and creating these networks. A better understanding is also required of how the feminization of both migration and the workforce affect these networks, whether they are based on kin relationships or nationality. This holds particular methodological questions and challenges, especially when using snowball techniques in interviewing, such as ‘how do you know when you have finished interviewing the whole network?’

Finally, more research needs to be conducted into the factors that are ‘pushing’ more child migrants and unaccompanied minors across borders in SADC.
South Africa is a major destination country for SADC migrants and those from further field on the continent as well as from overseas. It is also a sending country, with South African migrants traveling to the rest of the continent, but, it seems more often overseas. Out-migration from South Africa is dominated by skilled professional migrants. Skills shortages are a significant problem for the country and its future development.

The geography of South Africa lends itself to relatively easy crossing by SADC migrants, documented and undocumented. The country shares a 967km border with Namibia, a 1 840km with Botswana, a 225km border with Zimbabwe, a 491km border with Mozambique, 430km border with Swaziland and a 909km border with the land-locked kingdom of Lesotho. Parts of the borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique are demarcated by an electric fence, other borders are populated by wild animals, whilst rivers present particular dangers for ‘border-jumpers’.

**Numbers**

Since 1990, and particularly since the formation of the post-apartheid government in 1994, South Africa has seen a massive increase in movement to-and-fro across its borders. The majority of this traffic is with other SADC countries and involves people arriving for short-term visits. Migration data in South Africa is collected by the Department of Home Affairs but collated and published by Statistics South Africa.130 Published statistics only show the number of times the border is crossed for a particular purpose, not the number of people who are involved. This can be misleading as an individual may cross the border once a month, and in the case of some small scale cross-border traders every week and even more frequently. Every time they cross they are counted. The data is by region of origin and purpose of visit: business, holiday, study, work, contract workers, border traffic concession and transit. Significantly, ‘arrivals’ are not disaggregated by sex. A summary of ‘arrivals’ into South Africa from selected SADC countries is provided below.

Table 1 demonstrates the very high numbers of Basotho and Swazi border crossings relative to total population. In the case of Lesotho, the number of entries amounts to some 95% of the official population of 2,031,348 and in the case of Swaziland, 96% of the estimated 1,032,000 population. The next highest number of entries relative to population is Botswana representing some 47% of the population of 1,639,833.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total foreign travellers 2006</th>
<th>Total foreign travellers 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>17,047</td>
<td>17,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>29,005</td>
<td>28,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>765,705</td>
<td>798,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1,919,889</td>
<td>1,668,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>124,914</td>
<td>107,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>926,496</td>
<td>648,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>225,020</td>
<td>220,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>993,030</td>
<td>911,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>160,984</td>
<td>128,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>989,614</td>
<td>783,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 provides a snapshot of the given reasons for the arrival of SADC visitors during December 2006:

The obvious anomaly in the figures is the overwhelming number of people recorded as visiting South Africa for purposes of holidays which represent 95.65% of all cross-border crossings. However, just 1,664 or 0.28% were recorded as entering for work purposes. December is the height of the holiday season in South Africa, but as Table 3 demonstrates a similar pattern is recorded during the low holiday season of July, when 92.06% of all entries were for ‘holidays’ in the middle of the winter season. In contrast just 1,564 (0.29%) of entrants were recorded as crossing the border for work purposes, just 100 less than in December of the same year. This is because small scale cross-border traders and shoppers usually enter on visitors permits and are recorded in the ‘holiday’ category.

Visitors to South Africa (whether traders or tourists) make a significant contribution to the South African...
economy. SA Tourism calculates the direct spend by visitors to the country. Spending by visitors from Africa and the Middle East exceeded the combined expenditure of visitors from the Americas, Asia & Australasia and Europe. In terms of visitors total direct spend by country, in 2005 seven of the top ten spending countries were from SADC including the top four (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Lesotho). These visitors include small scale cross-border traders, as well as others, who contribute to South Africa’s retail and wholesale economies.

Africa is also an important source of border crossings for business purposes. In 2005, Africans comprised 65 percent of all border crossings for business purposes, but it should be noted that over 25 percent of these were from Lesotho reflecting the close ties between the two countries.

The numbers of migrants in South Africa are often overestimated. In 2006 only around 45,000 work permits were issued in 2006, returning to levels only seen in the early 1990s, and considerably higher than the approximately 15,000 issued and renewed at a low point in 2000. The issuing of permanent residence permits also declined dramatically in the 1990s, but a change in policy has seen an increase in the mid-2000s (see table below).

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133. Sally Peberdy et al., ‘Towards a fairer deal...’

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### Table 2 – Reasons for arrival of SADC visitors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>December 2005</th>
<th>December 2006</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Holiday</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Transit</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2056</td>
<td>2292</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2057</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>86953</td>
<td>90936</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>88064</td>
<td>2056</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>153225</td>
<td>182070</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>171216</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>173623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>9504</td>
<td>11091</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>10432</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>68103</td>
<td>83736</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>83023</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>83649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>28467</td>
<td>28426</td>
<td>1637</td>
<td>25263</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1156</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>92301</td>
<td>102064</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>100566</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>101955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>13109</td>
<td>16377</td>
<td>1601</td>
<td>14502</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>77827</td>
<td>86633</td>
<td>2435</td>
<td>82225</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>86444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3 – Reasons for arrival of SADC visitors during the ‘holiday’ period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>July 2005</th>
<th>July 2006</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Holiday</th>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Transit</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2329</td>
<td>2451</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>74806</td>
<td>68444</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>62468</td>
<td>5124</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>68388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>138729</td>
<td>167962</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>151546</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>155380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>9364</td>
<td>11700</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>10755</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>66002</td>
<td>80377</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>79082</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>80337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>18044</td>
<td>18542</td>
<td>2227</td>
<td>12517</td>
<td>2585</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1122</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>78090</td>
<td>85895</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>83170</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>85787</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>10987</td>
<td>13975</td>
<td>1808</td>
<td>11534</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>70125</td>
<td>86759</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>80532</td>
<td>2999</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>86577</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Until 1993 South Africa did not recognize refugees and refugee legislation only came into force in 2000, despite some 350 000 Mozambicans fleeing across the border into South Africa to escape civil war. In 2006, South Africa apparently became the world’s top destination for asylum seekers, receiving 53,400, or one tenth of all new asylum seekers globally in 2006. South Africa is currently home to just over 200,000 asylum seekers, yet it also has the highest number, over 131,000, of undecided cases and cases on appeal. The problems in the Department in processing claims which means asylum-seekers can wait 2-5 years for adjudication encourages to abuse of the system as asylum-seekers and refugees are allowed to work and study.

Irregular migration is a significant feature of SADC migration to South Africa. Published, and highly questionable, estimates of ‘illegal’ migrants in South Africa have ranged from 2.4 to 8 million have stoked this creeping xenophobia. These figures are unrealistic and demonstrate the irrationality of perceptions around irregular migration as in 2001 South Africa’s total adult population was only around 28,000,000. In part these figures were based on a 1995 report by the Human Sciences Research Council claiming there were between 2.4 million and 5.1 million ‘illegal aliens’ living in South Africa. The HSRC methodology was strongly questioned and the research later withdrawn. A 1996 HSRC survey (not withdrawn) reported 500 000 un-]documented migrants living in South Africa.

The response of the South African state has been to deport over one million undocumented Mozambicans, Zimbabweans and Basotho since 1994. In 2004 a total of 167 137 irregular migrants were deported rising to 209 988 in 2005.

Incidents of racial profiling and discrimination have been reported as well as arbitrary treatment of migrants at border posts. The experience of undocumented migrants detained by the authorities often fails to meet acceptable standards. Undocumented migrants are sent to the Lindela Repatriation Centre or police stations. The centre has been the subject of two critical reports written by the South African Human Rights Commission in 1999 and 2000. Undocumented female migrants are occasionally subjected to sexual harassment and abuse by border officials and members of the SAPS and it is reported that sexual favours are exchanged in order to avoid being sent to Lindela. The 2000 SAHRC report notes women and girls at held at Lindela and in police stations are at risk of being targets of sexual abuse, ranging from acts of rape and abduction, to offers of safe passage in return for sexual favours.

### Legislative, policy and bureaucratic context of migration into South Africa

With the exception of contract mineworkers and farm workers, for the majority of South Africa’s history only white people could enter as temporary or permanent immigrants. At times attempts were made to exclude ‘unwanted’ white immigrants, such as Jewish people in the 1930s, and southern Europeans in the 1960s. From 1986 relaxations were made to immigration and (internal) ‘influx control laws and regulations. Black African legal migration from the continent remained limited and largely targeted teachers and medical professionals.

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professionals to work in the still existing ‘homelands.’
No refugee legislation existed.

The making of new immigration and refugee legisla-
tion and policy has been long, arduous and contested.
Green and White papers immigration were only pub-
lished in 1997 and 1999 respectively. The first ever
Refugee Act was passed in 1998 and came into force
in 2000. After the threat of numerous constitutional
challenges a new South African Immigration Act was
eventually signed into law in 2002 and key aspects of
the Act were amended in 2004. A significant shift in
policy came in tandem with the new Immigration Act.
One of the aims of the Act is to facilitate the entry of
skilled migrants and immigrants, however in practice it
is still a cumbersome procedure.

The delay in passing new legislation was partly influ-
enced by prevailing public sentiment over the perceived
‘flood’ of foreigners entering the country. The Executive
branch of government was also receptive to the view-
point of officials within the Department of Home Affairs
urging that existing legislation and regulations were
appropriate, necessary and adequate to meet the
country’s needs. Little recognition was given to the
role migrants could play in meeting the country’s acute
and growing skills shortage, nor to the entrepreneurial
capital many migrants bring, nor indeed to the fraternal
solidarity and support African countries had shown
to the thousands of South Africans in exile during the
anti-apartheid struggle.

Responsibility for migration related issues is shared
between the Department of Home Affairs (process-
ing applications, population register, deportation and
repatriation), the South African Revenue Service (or
customs, responsible for border posts), the South Afri-
can Police Services and the South African Defence Force
(responsible for policing borders and inside the bor-
ders). The workload of the Department of Home Affairs
has increased dramatically since 1994 (in 1990 there
were approximately 1 million border crossings, in 2006
there were over 8 million), but an institutional feature
complicating the administration and management of
migrant issues in South Africa is the dysfunctional
nature of the Department which is responsible for all
migration matters.

This is a problem that started at ministerial level.
Migrants have been the unwitting victims of party
political tensions within the South African govern-
ment of national unity. The leader of the opposition
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) Mangosuthu Buthelezi,
was appointed Minister of Home Affairs. Tensions sub-
sequently arose between the Minister and his Director
Generals who are appointed by the (African National
Congress) President. These tensions largely fell away
in 2004 when a new ANC woman Minister (Nosiviwe
Mapisa-Nqakula) was appointed. Although, indicating
problems finding appropriate leadership for the Depart-
ment, the fourth Director General under her tenure
(including the incumbent when she was appointed),
joined Home Affairs in 2007.

It is not only at the political and executive level that
the Department has been hobbled. A 2004 SAMP ser-
vice delivery survey found low levels of awareness of
major departmental policy and key legislation, such
as the Immigration Act (40% unfamiliarity) and the
Refugees Act (60% unfamiliarity) among staff of the
Department. Yet the survey also demonstrated rela-
tively better levels of ‘customer’ satisfaction with the
Department than might have been expected. This could
be because clients have low expectations. By its own
admission, prior to 2005, the Directorate of Refugee
Affairs was characterized by “a lack of leadership, ca-
pacity at management level and a lack of integrated
systems.” The Department is still populated with of-
icials appointed under the previous government and
imbued with the restrictive and exclusory ethos that
pervaded the apartheid regime.

The Department is strongly associated with corruption
and has been the subject of frequent exposure of en-
demic corrupt practices and poor work practices but is
endeavouring to stamp them out. Some, 64.4% of all
Departmental dismissals in 2005-06 were for commit-
ting, or aiding and abetting bribery and corruption. Corrup-
tion, bribe-taking and extortion by border and
customs officials are widely reported, thus impacting

140. Yul Derek Davids, Kate Lefko-Everett and Vincent Williams, ‘The quality of migration services delivery in South Africa’, Southern African Mi-
gration Project, Migration Project Policy Series No. 41, Cape Town, South Africa, 2005.
negatively on migrants and vulnerable female migrants in particular.

In 2007, the new Director General instituted an extensive evaluation of the Department with the aim of establishing (yet another) “turnaround strategy” to improve service delivery and minimize corruption. Announcing the latest attempt to fix the Department, the Home Affairs Minister declared,

The new Home Affairs is about setting and meeting realistic delivery targets consistently and efficiently, it is about new technologies synchronized with existing infrastructure to enhance our ability to oversee, direct and speed up our delivery processes. And it is about a new level of co-operation with the law enforcement agencies in driving out corruption ... The new Home Affairs has no place for the corrupt, the lazy, or inefficient; no space for loafers.142

It would be misleading to depict the South African government as insensitive and un-responsive to the changing patterns of regional migration to South Africa. For example, South Africa has signed treaty agreements with most SADC countries waiving entry visa requirements for between 30 to 90 day visitors. However, stringent and expensive requirements remain in place for Zimbabweans in particular. Students from SADC countries pay less for study permits and lower international student fees.

The Department has also recognized the problem of xenophobia. In April 2005 the Immigration Branch of the Department was re-formed and a ‘Counter Xenophobia’ division established. The division consulted local and international specialists, academics and policy analysts and civil society more broadly and started training of officials within the Department. With the exception of an independent course attended by some Departmental managers, internal training of the Department does not address diversity training (including gender) or gender issues in migration including the particular challenges and problems faced by female migrants.

The Department of Home Affairs, like all South African government departments has a ‘gender focal point’ but it is unclear what the role or effectiveness of this position is. No information is available on the composition of Home Affairs, customs, police and military responsible for policing migration. But, they appear to be overwhelmingly male at the border posts visited during research.

**The migrant experience in South Africa**

A defining characteristic of the migrant experience in South Africa is that of xenophobia. The scrapping of all forms of racial ‘influx control’ and political democratisation has made South Africa a far more favoured destination for SADC migrants, but has also brought migrants and South Africans into far greater social contact and indeed conflict. Attempts have been made to explain South African xenophobia as a ‘rational’ (selfinterested and self-protecting) response to increased unemployment in the post-1994 period,143 a socio-economic phenomenon that is popularly perceived as being exacerbated by migrants. It has also been associated with the post-1994 nation building process and that all South Africans now have the right to make claims on the state so migrants are now seen as potential competitors for state resources.144 Given the history of relative deprivation and exclusion of black South Africans wrought by apartheid, it is perhaps understandable that any perceived threat to the life opportunities of the majority South Africans would be met with hostility. However, SAMP research shows that xenophobic attitudes in South Africa cut across race, class and sex.145 And, that they are echoed by citizens of other SADC countries.

South Africa has an official unemployment rate of some 25.5% and an expanded unemployment rate (those who are unemployed and have given up looking for work) of close to 40%. Intensifying this problem is the fact that South Africa is a country of high internal migration. South African internal migrants are generally work-seekers from poorer rural areas migrating to the larger conurbations, industrial nodes, or mines, and thus any external ‘competition’ over scarce jobs is

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143. A net one million formal jobs have been shed since 1994. The informal sector has, however, shown considerable growth.
felt acutely by internal migrants.\textsuperscript{146} In addition, internal labour migration also showed an increase during the 1990s, with the number of female labour migrants increasing significantly from 30\% in 1993 to 34\% by 1999.\textsuperscript{147}

The problem is further amplified by the fact that research indicates that SADC migrants have historically fared quite well in job-seeking in South Africa. Table 5 shows the relative success of migrants from Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe in securing work in South Africa. It is noteworthy that there are gender discrepancies or differences in formal and informal employment patterns of migrants. A 1997 study indicated some two thirds of male migrants were engaged in wage-earning activities whilst the figure for women was 45\%.\textsuperscript{148} This has been interpreted as reinforcing the view that female migrants engage in far more street and cross-border trading.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Lesotho & Mozambique & Zimbabwe & Total \\
\hline
Job before migrating & 69\% & 43\% & 22\% & 52\% \\
Obtained job in SA & 31\% & 57\% & 64\% & 46\% \\
No answer & 0\% & 0\% & 14\% & 2\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Migrants’ ability to secure work in South Africa}
\end{table}

Table 5 – Migrants’ ability to secure work in South Africa

Xenophobia is further amplified by perceptions of high levels of criminality amongst migrants.\textsuperscript{149} A 2000 survey revealed that 48\% of those sampled felt that migrants represent a criminal threat, whilst 37\% felt they were a threat to their job opportunities and 29\% who felt migrants represented a health threat.\textsuperscript{150} In 2002 the former Director General of the Department of Home Affairs claimed in a presentation to parliament, Approximately 90\% of persons who are in the RSA with fraudulent documents, i.e. either citizenship or migration documents, are involved in other crimes as well ... It is quicker to charge these criminals for their false documentation and then to deport them than to pursue the long route in respect of the other crimes that are committed.\textsuperscript{151}

However, in 2007, less than 300 of South Africa’s large prison population were found to be foreign nationals. A further disturbing phenomenon is the alleged use of the arrest of un-documented migrants to ‘boost’ SAPS anti-crime statistics. One anti-crime operation in Johannesburg alone claimed to have netted some 800 ‘illegal immigrants’. Although over 300 were later found be asylum seekers, refugees and legal migrants with permits to be in South Africa.

Indicating shifting attitudes at local government levels, as well as a recognition of the economic contribution of migrants to South Africa, a welcome local government initiative is the establishment in March 2007 of a Migrants Help Desk in the city of Johannesburg (with the largest migrant population in South Africa). The initiative is designed to present a more ‘welcoming face’ to migrants and to assist them finding relevant information to establish themselves within the city.\textsuperscript{152}

Swahili, French and Portuguese language speakers are on hand to provide assistance and information. Whilst the rationale for the establishment of the help desk makes no mention of the particular needs of female migrants, city officials involved in the initiative acknowledge them and view the help desk as being potential highly beneficial to and supportive of female migrants. Nevertheless, the ‘uptake’ at the helpdesk has been disappointing since its launch in April. By the end of June a mere 119 migrants had consulted the help desk. Of these the overwhelming majority are males, with “only a small number of females” reported as making


\textsuperscript{147} Dorrit Posel, ‘Have migration patterns in post-apartheid South Africa changed?’ Paper prepared for Conference on Migration in Comparative Perspective, Johannesburg, South Africa, 4-7 June, 2003.


\textsuperscript{149} "Is new POPCRU action xenophobic", Citizen, Johannesburg, Tuesday June 12, 2007.

\textsuperscript{150} Quoted in Jonathan Crush and Sally Peberdy, ‘Criminal Tendencies: Immigrants and Illegality in South Africa’, Southern African Migration Project, Migration Policy Brief No. 10, Cape Town, South Africa, 2

\textsuperscript{151} As quoted in Crush and Peberdy, ibid, p.1

\textsuperscript{152} An exposition of the rationale and working of the Johannesburg City’s Migrant Help Desk was delivered by Councillor Theresa Van Der Merwe at the SAIIA-INSTRAW Inter-Agency meeting in Johannesburg on 30 May 2007.
use of the centre. Some 78% of those making use of the centre are Zimbabweans (none from Lesotho, Mozambique, Botswana, Malawi or Namibia), and 82% were undocumented.

In addition to being victims of violence, overt hostility and social exclusion, migrants who find work in South Africa and particularly female migrants, are thought to be susceptible to economic exploitation. However, dominant sectors of employment for migrant workers are notorious for exploitative employment practices for all workers. Incidence of South African employers taking advantage of the vulnerability of migrants, particularly undocumented migrants, is evident. Interviews with female migrants conducted by SAIIA as part of the INSTRAW research in 2007 reveal a pattern of underpayment, exploitation and more cynical practices of employing undocumented female migrants and then calling the authorities to arrest and deport undocumented workers before paying them for their work. The perception amongst undocumented female migrants of corruption within the SAPS and collusion between it and certain employers is pervasive.

Finally, two other phenomena are noteworthy. The first is that of South African women being ‘married’ to male migrants without their knowledge or legal consent. This practice occurs in collusion with Department of Home Affairs officials. Details from South African identity documents are used to create marriage certificates to non-nationals allowing them to use the marriage certificates to apply for permanent residence, or more frequently ID documents are issued without a formal application for permanent residence being made. The Department recently asked women to check their marital status on the population register so false and unknown marriages could be annulled. This also allowed women who had knowingly made marriages of convenience to non-nationals to have them annulled. However, being married without your knowledge is problematic as it may take some time to discover the marriage and have it reversed. This is a traumatic, costly, time-consuming and demeaning process for the women exploited in this way.

Thus in summary, whilst in numeric terms South Africa is an increasingly popular destination for migrants and female migrants in particular; it is also an often hostile and precarious destination for female migrants. Furthermore, whilst contract workers work in South Africa, the economic opportunities open to female migrants are more limited in scope, location and pay. Female migrants rank as some of the most exploited of all workers in South Africa.

153. Some surveys indicate that one in four migrants to South Africa have experienced physical assaults, intimidation, or threats of violence.
1. Focus Group Objectives

The SAIIA-INSTRAW focus group meeting held on 27 February 2007 had a number of important objectives:

- The first of these was to alert stakeholders to the launch of the UN-INSTRAW/SAIIA research thereby generating greater awareness of the specific areas of research, the existing and recent UN-INSTRAW research and to sensitize key constituencies to the field of female migrancy, remittances and development.

- The second objective was to draw together a number of the important researchers, role-players and stakeholders involved in areas relating to the research, study and practice of female migrant remittances and development in the SADC region. Very few role players, stakeholders, or researchers are engaged in all aspects of this field of research, thus experts from individual areas were invited on the assumption that collectively, shared knowledge would lead to a more coherent understanding of the research area. The related objective of inviting a wide range of stakeholders was to identify and better understand the current, planned, prospective areas of research and engagement in the related fields of female migrants, remittances and development. The Focus Group would also help to identify gaps in the current body of research.

- The stakeholders, role-players, researchers and activists was invited to the focus group including: migrancy researchers, gender researchers, policy analysts, university academics, commercial banks involved in remittances, SADC diplomats, NGOs, activists, international agencies and representatives from the South African local, provincial and national government.

- The third objective of the focus group was to provide a platform for a wide range of stakeholders to meet, interact, exchange experiences and to reflect on the phenomena under discussion.

- The fourth objective was to identify gaps in the bibliography and early desk-top research conducted by SAIIA.

- The fifth objective was to help identify the location of female migrant communities in urban and border areas in South Africa.

- The sixth objective was to help identify the existence or otherwise of migrant associations, hometown associations and support groups.

- The seventh objective was to help better understand the SADC female migrant experience from the home country, the modalities of migration and the female migrant experience in South Africa.

All these objectives were achieved to a significant degree.

2. Levels of awareness

It is noteworthy that few researchers, institutions, agencies, donors or stakeholders contacted were consciously aware of this field of research. For many of those invited to participate, the phenomenon of female migrants was an issue that they had given little thought to or paid little attention to, or was simply regarded as relatively insignificant. To some degree this may be explained by the preponderance of SADC migrants being men and thus the general conception of a migrant in SADC being that of a male and typically a miner from a contiguous country. Given the historical patterns of migrancy in SADC this is understandable, yet also reflects the lack of attention being paid to the changing economic patterns of migrancy and in particular the growth in the number of female migrants within the SADC region.

The second explanation relates to stereotypes of what constitutes a migrant. In addition to the gendered and male-centric thinking of many stakeholders in South Africa, women entering South Africa from regional countries are often conceived as doing so to accompany their migrant labour spouses or partners (the perceived real or primary migrants), or alternatively...
as domestic and casual workers seeking employment in South Africa. Very little consideration of female migrants making conscious economic and self-actualizing decisions to migrate appears to have been considered. Consequently, the broader range of female migrant economic activity and its potential for female remittances back to their home country is seldom considered. Moreover, the gender and familial dynamics and impact of female migrancy appear to be given very little scholarly and still less policy attention.

A third ‘awareness’ issue relates to the increasing and laudable attention paid to the phenomenon of SADC women and girl child trafficking and their attendant abuse. This exploitation captures far greater public attention than the quiet, hidden and often invisible phenomenon of female migrants, yet the latter is of growing economic and social significance. This is not to suggest that the issue and publicization of the women and girl child trafficking issues ‘crowds out’ that of research into female migrants, but it is a far more sensitive, alarming and attention-grabbing phenomenon in the public minds eye. An issue that is often conflated too is that of SADC female migrants engaged in sex work. Whilst the publicization of this phenomenon is welcome with respect to issues of health, personal safety and exploitation of SADC female migrants, it may have the unintended consequence of cultivating stereotypical images of SADC female migrants. Sex work is illegal in South Africa and thus the multiple conceptual prejudice is inculcated of SADC female migrants being regarded as promiscuous, at high risk of HIV infection, generally undocumented and engaging in illegal (if not illicit) activity creates an often stigmatizing, unjustified, prejudiced and hostile public perception.

3. Focus Group Discussion

Background and introduction

SAIIA researcher Ayesha Kajee chaired the meeting and after delegates introduced themselves she outlined the background to the study, including an explanation of the work of INSTRAW and the relationship between INSTRAW and SAIIA. Grateful acknowledgement was made of the funding support received from the United Nations Population Fund. The methodological tool developed by INSTRAW, as well as the study of Dominican Republic female migrants was briefly explained. The current SAIIA-INSTRAW study involves conducting desk top research, the documenting of the local role players and stakeholders involved in the areas of migrancy, female migrancy, gender, remittances and development issues in SADC, (focusing specifically on female migrants to South Africa from Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe) as well as assessing the impact of remittances from SA to communities of origin. The final deliverable of this phase of work is the conceptualization, design and writing of a larger project proposal to take the research forward. INSTRAW seeks to support capacity building programmes, increase awareness of promoting rural development through remittances and to integrate gender into local institutions involved in migration.

The focus group was the first of two meetings to be convened to provide expert input into the research; the second was to be held in May with the aim of drawing together a group of experts to discuss the SAIIA findings and help define a future research agenda. Delegates were invited to fully participate in the initial phases of the research programme and to make input and suggestions throughout. The research is significant in a number of respects. Firstly, it was the first time that the issue of female migrancy, remittances and development had been examined holistically in SADC. Secondly, this form of migrancy and remittances constituted a South-South pattern which was globally unusual and may reveal particular or even unique characteristics. SAIIA research fellow Tim Hughes conducted an interactive power-point presentation which served as a backdrop and framework for the focus group discussion. The growth and significance of migration globally was highlighted and in particular the significant increase in female migrants to now constitute more than 50% of this total. Notably too this pattern is uneven, with women constituting up to 70-80% of migrants in certain countries. Whilst international research on female migrants has tended to lag behind this trend, the
INSTRAW research represents a significant contribution to better understanding this phenomenon. The increasing feminization of migrancy was briefly contextualized within global patterns of aging OECD populations and the generation of global care-giving chains, but also at the local African level within the context of the impact of structural adjustment policies, austerity measures, privatization, down-sizing, right-sizing, the normalization of labour and the consequential ‘brain drain and brain gain’ patterns. The particularities of shifting economic patterns in SADC particularly with respect to South Africa’s mining sector, the growth in tourism and the service sectors and resultant employment patterns and their implications for migrancy were discussed as significant factors.

It was noted too that despite the recent scholarly attention being applied to female migration in SADC, economic migration to South Africa dates back well over a century and thus many SADC families and in some countries a majority of families have a family member who is or was a migrant. These patterns of migrancy are dynamic and fluid however and are not purely driven by economic forces. In the case of Zimbabwe, since 2000 the rates and patterns of migrancy to South Africa have changed profoundly to the point were economic migrants and political refugees are often indistinguishable.

The transfer of cash, goods and services by migrants back to the country of origin or home country, namely remittances, has been identified as an increasingly significant global financial, economic and developmental phenomenon. In response, the World Bank, IMF, United Nations and development agencies have begun paying far more attention to remittance flows and the potential developmental impact these may hold for the receiving country. Amounting to some US$250 billion, the financial quantum of remittances now exceeds official development assistance to developing countries.

Whilst the case for the potential for enhanced development of migrant remittances receiving countries has been made, this must be evaluated within the context of the loss of skills, labour and the socially disruptive consequences of migration. Furthermore, some have argued that remittances create artificial, inflated and skewed pricing and consumption patterns as well as chains of economic dependency. The counter-argument to this is that returning migrants bring back enhanced skills, experience and capital that may be re-invested back into the local economy thereby making a significant contribution to local development. It is not clear from current research whether remittances also contribute to deeper local inequality, particularly through the purchase of local land and property and thereby inflating local prices and crowding out local buyers. Migrancy and remittances may also contribute to the hardening or shifting of local class differentials. What is even less well understood and profoundly under-researched is the nature of gender patterns, structures and dynamics as they impact on female migrancy. Questions such as who within the family unit makes the decision to migrate and how this is negotiated for example, receive little scholarly attention. The inhibitors and propellants or the so-called ‘pull and push’ factors of female migration in SADC have received little attention, nor has the impact of female migration on the family unit. The gender dynamics of the control, use and even ‘ownership’ of remittances likewise appears to have received scant attention.

At the level of migration policy too, although the SADC protocol on the free movement of people has been signed at the heads of state level, it has yet to come into effect and appears to have been resisted by receiving countries, most notably South Africa. Furthermore, gender policy in SADC has to date been tardy in its implementation, although the SADC protocol on gender equality is due to be signed at the SADC summit in Lusaka Zambia in August 2007.

The contention that women are migrating increasingly on their own and as main economic providers and less as economic dependents of their spouses was floated for discussion. This argument was highly contested within the Forum and provoked considerable debate amongst delegates. Whilst it was accepted that there is evidence of an increasing number of females in SADC being better educated and migrating to seek improved
career and income prospects (of their own choice and volition), the overwhelming majority of female migrants in SADC remain relatively poorly educated, seek domestic, service or casual work and do so in the interests of the family unit. The thesis advanced by Dr Sally Peberdy of the University of the Witwatersrand and the Southern African Migration Project that despite the increasing feminization of migration in SADC, the decision to migrate, the networks utilized to migrate, the social experience of migration and female insertion into the labour market are all differentiated by gender was also raised and debated. Moreover the socially challenging and ‘disruptive’ nature of female migration was raised, particularly as it plays itself out in the gender relations of the family unit. Questions were asked in particular about who within the family unit decides as to who and how decisions are made about the expenditure and utilization of remittances sent by female migrants.

Basic, yet fundamental questions were asked about why women migrate in SADC. Other questions raised related to where SADC females migrate and what economic activities they seek to engage in and eventually undertake. Delegates contended that whilst the so-called ‘push and pull’ thesis had useful currency, this dichotomous conceptualization of women as simply and rationally responding to push factors such as local unemployment, or the death of a breadwinner on the one hand, or the ‘attraction’ of higher income earning capacity in South Africa for example were too simplistic. It was contended that women migrate for a host of economic, professional family, social, political, legal, aspirational, structural and environmental factors, all of which are mediated through the prism of complex gender and family relations.

**HIV/AIDS and female migration in SADC**

HIV/AIDS is a pervasive and acute threat to development in SADC. Infection rates run as high as 38% and 33% in Swaziland and Botswana respectively. Life expectancy is now 36-37 in Swaziland and has dropped to 39 years in Zimbabwe, in part due to the impact of Aids. Whilst the social and economic impact of the pandemic is already discernable, the expected mortality from full blown Aids deaths has yet to play itself out in the region. What is known, however, is that the virus is particularly prevalent in the sexually reproductive and economically active cohort of the population, particularly those between the ages of 18-35. Thus it was important to open a dialogue within the forum to begin to understand the impact of HIV/Aids on female migration in the region. Research into the dynamic between HIV/Aids and female migration in SADC is in its infancy. During SAIIA’s preliminary research we have been unable to find evidence of specific research into HIV/Aids, female migrancy and gender relations in SADC. Delegates from the International Organization for Migration and the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) alerted the forum to early scoping work conducted into the dynamics of HIV/Aids and migration in SADC however. The provisional findings of this research hold that people with Aids typically return to live with family members to obtain care, but others may migrate to provide care for family members with HIV/Aids and who live elsewhere. The loss of household income through mortality or morbidity of breadwinners encourages migration by other household members to seek income-earning opportunities. People who display physical evidence of full blow Aids may migrate to avoid social stigmatization by the community. People with HIV/AIDS may migrate to receive better treatment (such as ARVs) than is locally available and this may include crossing borders for treatment. Aids related mortality disproportionately affects the most economically productive strata of SADC societies and thus may induce recruitment and migration to fill the consequential skills gaps. Widows or widowers may migrate upon the death of their partner. The African tradition of wife inheritance means that the brother of a deceased may ‘inherit’ his widow, thus requiring her to relocate or migrate to join him. Children orphaned by HIV/AIDS may be forced to, or opt to, move or migrate to other relatives or elsewhere to seek income earning opportunities. A further interpretation is that in some instances the impact of HIV/AIDS will be to curb certain migration as the loss of a future generation of grandparents means that there will be inadequate familial support structures to look after the children of economic migrants. Despite the presentation of these provisional findings of the IOM
work and SAMP research, the unanimous consensus amongst delegates was that research into HIV/Aids and migration was still inadequate and research into HIV/Aids, female migration and gender dynamics was almost non-existent. Moreover, public prejudices and misperceptions regarding HIV/Aids and female migration are widespread. For example a SADC diplomat present at the Focus Group contended that the main reason women from 'his country' migrate to South Africa is to collect the pensions of their deceased husbands who had died of HIV/Aids.

Remittances

An introductory presentation was conducted into the most recent findings concerning remittances in SADC, in particular the research of Genesis Consulting and FinMark Trust. These studies tend to highlight the relatively high cost of remittances from South Africa to other SADC countries, the absence of Western Union from local markets, the continued use of Teba Bank and the Post Office by longer term and contractual workers and the burgeoning trade in informal transfer of remittances through family, friends, taxis and couriers. These informal channels of remittance are particularly popular and prevalent amongst Zimbabweans sending back from South Africa. These informal channels can be expensive, but efficient and avoid the massive losses that would otherwise be incurred remitting through the parallel (official/unofficial) exchange rate. It was noted that cash is also remitted via cell/mobile phone transfers. This chain of remittance is as follows: the Zimbabwean migrant earns surplus cash she wishes to remit. She makes contact with a money broker in South Africa who accepts her cash and arranges for an equivalent amount (minus commission and exchange rate arbitrage) to be deposited into a corresponding account in Zimbabwe and for the money broker’s agent to draw the cash and deliver it to the appointed person or household in Zimbabwe. Other popular forms and modalities of remittances for Zimbabwean women include the transport of 25KG bags of maize via buses and taxis by couriers to be delivered directly to the home or household of the female migrant. Other more commercialized forms of remittance involve female migrants purchasing household goods such as furniture and appliances in a chain store in South Africa and the equivalent goods being delivered by a branch of the corresponding store in Zimbabwe.

A point of contention raised during the forum related to the high costs of and delays in transferring remittances through formal banking channels. One SADC diplomat claimed that a particular banking group with a long history of remittance transfers tended to “sit on cash for too long”, thus earning interest and delaying the effective date of transfer and receipt of the remittance. This he claimed was a “sharp practice” that had caused deep resentment amongst migrants and their families.

The question of the developmental impact of remittances was also debated. Whilst the thesis that migration and indeed remittances may have both positive developmental and potentially corrosive effects, the consensus of the Focus Group was that the evidence tended to suggest that SADC migrants’ remittances have had a generally positive developmental effect. Some contended that anthropological, sociological and participant observer research supported this contention in that households that were the recipients of remittances historically were economically better off, even if only marginally sometimes, this could mean the difference between relative poverty or deep and acute poverty for example. However, evidence of the developmental impact of migrants remittances often manifests itself in a better construction of house, better materials such as brick walls and tin roofs, or sometimes larger garden/ agricultural ownership, or greater mobility through the ownership of cars, carts and bicycles purchased either directly from remittances or money generated from the investment in other means of production from remittances (such as shops, stalls or the purchase of goods for resale). Dr Frans Maphosa’s research in Zimbabwe was referred to as the most authoritative in this regard, although case studies in Malawi and Mozambique also tend to support the thesis that the households of migrants, more specifically those in receipt of remittances, do economically better than those in the same village or area that do not.
The delegate from the World Bank contended, counter-intuitively perhaps, that her research indicated that female migrants in SADC exercise quite effective and tight control over the expenditure of their remittances back to the family unit, despite the distance and time away from home. This point was heavily debated, but is significant for our research going forward and requires follow-up discussion.

Finally, the role of government agencies and institutions in female migration to South Africa was raised. The overwhelming consensus from the Focus Group was that the Department of Home Affairs is dysfunctional and even dilatory with respect to dealing with SADC migrants and female migrants in particular. This is as a result of the legacy of apartheid, the disjuncture between legislation, policy and implementation, the lack of capacity and training within the Department to respond to the challenges it faces, poor managerial leadership and the failure of SADC countries themselves to ensure better policy co-ordination with respect to migrants. The plight of female migrants, women and child trafficking and female refugees with respect to the Department of Home Affairs was outlined in some detail by delegates from the IOM. However, this conception of the Department as being dysfunctional may in fact disguise or misunderstand the elements of institutionalised Departmental hostility and antipathy towards many female migrants.

Mapping the way forward

After the discussion of the key themes raised, delegates were requested to consider and point out areas that SAIIA had not raised, or questions that should be addressed in the next phase of the research. The following themes and areas were suggested:

There are considerable methodological challenges in researching female migrancy, remittances and development in SADC. Amongst these is the dearth of current research, the paucity and inaccuracy of existing and official data in SADC, the accessing of female migrants who prefer to remain ‘invisible’ to the authorities and anonymous, the fear of xenophobia, the absence of hometown associations or female migrant associations.

A second set of challenges raised was attempting to measure or ascertain the extent, quantum and nature of female migrant remittances in SADC given the often informal nature of such remittances.

The third set of challenges actually identifying female migrants and conducting interviews and gleaning useful data.

The fourth set of challenges does not concern us for this phase of the research, but is a key challenge going forward and that is attempting to measure, evaluate or understand the developmental impact of female remittances in the selected countries in SADC.

The fifth set of challenges raised relates to the theoretical, methodological and conceptual challenges and then the practical challenges of conducting interviews into the gender dynamics of female migration in SADC and remittances.

SAMP delegates pointed out the rise in the phenomenon of cross-borer migrants and noted that this required greater research.

These issues and concerns will be considered before the inter-agency meeting and will be raised then in order to benefit from the insights and advice of other experts in the field.
Annex 3 – Interview Guide and Notes

SAIIA-INSTRAW guide for conducting interviews with female migrants to South Africa from the SADC region.

Treat the questions as guidelines to provide consistency and structure, but be flexible in allowing the interviewee to develop their responses and allow the interview to pursue important, relevant and interesting issues. Be sensitive to questions of identity, to issues of personal security, to questions of 'legality' (documented and un-documented), to questions of a personal nature and to the sanctity of the individual and privacy. If a response appears inconsistent, or one of avoidance, or one of embarrassment, or an 'expected' response is given, do not push the interviewee to provide a different response, but rather come back to the issue later in the interview if it is of significance and attempt to assess the reason for the response. This may provide a different response that can be cross-referenced with other responses. Remember many interviewees feel threatened, vulnerable, or insecure about their status and one’s approach must be framed with this sensitivity uppermost. However, if an interviewee is highly confident and has much more to say on a topic or question, allow them as much time and space as is possible to derive as much benefit from their insights and opinions. Be cognisant of the interviewee’s time constraints, as whilst they are answering questions, they could be out making a living or attending to other pressing matters.

What is your age?
Are you married, widowed, divorced or single?
What is your educational background and highest level?
Do you have other qualifications and if so what are they?
What was your work before migrating?
Do you regard yourself as the head of the household and if so why, or if not why not?
Can you describe the reasons that made you leave?

Why did you choose to migrate to South Africa in particular?
Did you have or do you have relatives that have also migrated to South Africa?
What was your family’s opinion when you migrated?
Did you have to negotiate your migration with your family?
Did being a woman make it more difficult or easier for you to leave your family and why?
Do you think more women are migrating from your area and if so why do you think this is?
How did you get to South Africa?
How did you choose or find a place to stay in South Africa?
Did people from your country or home town or relatives or friends help you to find a place to stay?
Do you live amongst other people from your country?
Are there associations or groupings, or support networks amongst the migrant community where you live?
Do you belong to such a grouping and if so what does it do, or what do you do for it?
Have you found work in South Africa?
If so, what sort of work have you found?
If not, why do think this is?
Are you documented and does this make a difference to you finding work in SA?
Have you managed to send anything back home, such as food or money or clothing or goods?
If so what did you send?
How often do you manage to send something back home?
Do you have an estimate of how much or the value of the goods you send back home?
Do you ever manage to go home yourself?
If so, how often and when do you go home and for what purpose?
What benefit do you think what you send back has for your family back home?
Do you intend staying in SA or going elsewhere or going back home?
What will influence your decision on this?
Is there anything you would like to add?

Summary of responses to questions:

**Question 1**

Under 20 = 5 %
20-25 = 12%
25-30 = 30%
30-35 = 25%
35-40 = 11%
40-45 = 7%
45 + = 10%

**Question 2**

Single = 30%
Married = 25%
Partnered not married = 33%
Widowed = 9%
Divorced = 3%

**Question 3**

High school but incomplete = 12%
Finished high school = 54%
Post high school education = 34%

**Question 5**

The range of answers included:

Banker
Teacher
Nurse aid
Airline cabin crew attendant
Secretary
Waitress
Store manager

Administration officer
Relief teacher
Running a catering business
Home-based care-giver
Cross-border trader
Knitting clothing
Hotel work
Unemployed
Not working, living with parents

**Question 6**

Some 33% of respondents regarded themselves as family breadwinners, but some 50% responded that they had family members dependent on them.

**Question 7**

The Zimbabwean respondents (the majority of migrants interviewed) often answered that they left for political or politically related matters and in fact in many cases may more accurately be regarded as forced migrants or refugees. Nevertheless, below is a range of other ‘non-political’ answers:

“There was no work”
“We were suffering without jobs”
“I had to come to South Africa to support my Mum”
“I came to South Africa after my husband died”
“I came to South Africa to be able to support my kids back in Zimbabwe”
“I came to South Africa for business”
“I came here to join my Mother”

**Question 10**

This question evoked puzzlement and sometimes no response at all, but other responses included the following:

“It is not normal to leave your family and it is not normal to leave your home. I was not happy and my family is not happy.”

“Traditionally women are treasured, so when I needed to leave, it hurt my family”
"My in-laws thought it was improper for me to leave and they disapproved"

"I didn’t consult with anybody when I left; I just made my own decision to leave"

"It was easier for my Mum to feed me here in South Africa than back home so I came with her"

"My mum was already sending money home from South Africa, so I came to join her here"

**Question 12**

Responses included:

"It is much more difficult to leave as a woman. They, the family, expect you to stay and do the traditional things. You are not supposed to go away"

"Even if you have a high education or maybe even the highest education in the family, you are expected to stay at home or if you do go out to work you have to do this on their terms. So when you decide you need to leave to find work, or better work, it breaks them, the men"

"You know it is the women that are expected to provide in the difficult times and we cannot do this at home any more, so you find more and more women leaving to get better work and to provide for the family back home"

"My Father will never forgive me for leaving the family, but they accept what I send back home and know it is right"

**Question 13**

There was no clear or definitive pattern to the responses to this question and we deduced this was because those we interviewed had not particularly thought about it beforehand. However, those that did respond with clarity and confidence conveyed a sense that increasingly more women were migrating from their areas to South Africa. When we followed up with these respondents as to why they thought this was the case, there was a mixture of responses ranging from political reasons (husbands being detained or harassed and unable to find work in Zimbabwe), to increased male deaths in the family, to more affirmative responses such as "The women now have to go out and make a career for themselves". There was some evidence of the ‘demonstration effect’ of other women engaging in cross-border trading with South Africa which encouraged others to engage in this work too.

**Question 14**

Approximately half the women we interviewed were undocumented. The majority of the undocumented interviewees ‘border jump’, i.e. they do not pass through formal border migration and customs channels, but rather cross relatively close to the border post and then pick up taxis, lifts in cars or public transport on the other side of the border. Many women are smuggled across the border in an organised, yet often highly exploitative and sometimes dangerous manner. The smuggling networks are cross-border and a payment is made to the smuggler to transport women to the border and then another is made to those who actually smuggle them across the border. This latter practice often takes place with the connivance of the police, security and migration officials on either side of the border. However, it is at this point that women and indeed men are at their most vulnerable to extortion, threat and abuse. ‘Extra’ money is often extorted by smugglers at the point of border crossing or sometimes sexual favours are extracted when faced with the threat of handing over women to the authorities. It was clear from the interviewees that being handed over to the authorities not only brought with it the threat of incarceration and deportation, but the very same forms of abuse and exploitation extracted by smugglers.

Nevertheless, the channels for transporting migrants into and out of South Africa are generally highly efficient allowing migrants to travel between Harare and Johannesburg within a 24-hour period.

**Question 15**
What was striking about the responses to this question was the seeming lack of organisation, networking or pre-planning that went into securing a place to stay in South Africa. This was less the case for those with family members in South Africa. These migrants almost always had remained in communication with their relatives in South Africa and used them as a source of information, guidance and support with respect to accommodation and sometimes work. The only other common point of reference was church membership. The Central Methodist Church in Johannesburg has become well-known by Zimbabweans in particular as a place of refuge where nobody is turned away. Thus many migrants use the church as a first ‘port of call’ when arriving in Johannesburg as they are assured of shelter, bedding, food and to be in the company of other migrants and refugees. SAWIMA too has become a focal point for migrating women, particularly undocumented, seeking assistance with work, accommodation, health care and legal advice.

Question 17

We found no clear evidence from our interviewees that female migrants tend to congregate in particular areas in South Africa, besides being drawn to urban areas such as Johannesburg to find work. However, the responses tend to contradict what we experienced and encountered whilst setting up the interviews. For example, when setting up interviews with Zimbabwean female migrants, we went into very specific areas of Johannesburg (Berea and Hillbrow) to collect them to conduct the interviews over week-ends. Secondly, when we met with male migrants this happened at specific blocks of flats in Berea and Hillbrow at specific times when regular early evening meetings were being held. Furthermore, there are concentrations of migrants and cross-border traders in the South African towns of Mussina and Nelspruit in particular. There are concentrations of migrants and cross-border workers in some towns of the Free State bordering Lesotho, but many of these Basotho are daily border crossers who work in South Africa, or shop in South Africa or conduct daily trade with South Africa, rather than residing in South Africa for any period.

Question 18

Apart from church groups, none of the interviewees belonged to a hometown association or any other form of migrant grouping. Nor indeed did they know of the existence of such groupings. Nor did any research entity or researcher know of such associations or groupings in South Africa. The closest to such an organisation we encountered was a burial society in which ‘members’ make a contribution to an death burial insurance policy and the members ensure that the body is repatriated, generally to Zimbabwe. We were informed of caregiving groups for migrants suffering from HIV/Aids. SAWIMA performs some of the functions of a hometown association, but is a donor-funded NGO with clear and specific constitution, board and management structure and range of activities. It is not a voluntary association of migrants.

One interviewee perhaps misinterpreted the intention and meaning of our question and responded by saying, “Zimbabweans are not parasites, we are hard-working”

It became clear during interviews and surrounding discussions however, that female migrants in particular are fearful of xenophobia and mistreatment by the South African authorities and thus make conscious decisions not to aggregate or congregate, at least not during daylight hours or in public spaces. Thus meetings are often covert and irregular and not open to outsiders or even discussion. At times we had difficulty in finding interviewees that we were told had been arranged by trusted intermediaries and would have to wait in various places for more than three hours to provide interviewees and others of our bona fides and that there was no threat of officialdom in talking to us.

Every interviewee complained bitterly about the South African authorities, others complained about common xenophobia, another complained about xenophobia even at church. Another commented that migrants would rather stay on the East Rand (a more industrial working class area) than come into Johannesburg as they are safer and less vulnerable to the police, home affairs officials and criminals.
One interviewee complained, "What does the UNHCR do?!"

**Question 20**

Excluding cross-border traders and those with regular patterns of cross-border work in South Africa, one of the most surprising findings emerging from the interview was how few women had found work in South Africa and the even smaller number that had found permanent, full-time work in the formal sector. South Africa’s own unemployment rate is some 40% so the high rate of unemployment amongst interviewees ought not to have been a surprise, yet our working assumption based on other studies was that migrants tended to be more successful in finding, or even creating work. Some 40% of interviewees were unemployed, with another 20-30% finding periodic temporary employment. 10% were permanently employed in the formal sector, including nursing, home-based care-giving, hotel receptionist and a security guard. The balance found work at, or through, the church or conducting part-time ‘piece work’ such as selling newspapers. It should be noted too that women complained that as soon as landlords find out one is working, “They put the rental up”, leaving very little left over at the end of the month.

**Question 24**

The findings to question 20 obviously informed the responses to question 24. Here a distinction needs to be made between cross-border trades who simply carry their earnings or goods back across the border every day, or week and migrants who settle in South Africa seeking work. Of the latter, just 22% of interviewees regularly (monthly) remitted back home and some 40% remitted periodically. The overwhelming majority of interviewees responded that, "There is nothing left over at the end of the month". Others responded, “We do not even spend money on a cool drink or KFC, every cent is saved to send back to our children”.

No clear pattern of the quantum of the cash remittances sent back, but the most common response was in the order of R200-R300 per month (US$35-$40) per month. An equal number send food back on a monthly basis. None of the respondents use banks, post office or monogram services. The overwhelming majority (some 80%) sent remittances back with friends or relatives or intermediaries on buses, in taxis or by car. The balance generally deposited money with money changers in South Africa with the equivalent (minus commission) being handed over to the family or intended recipient in the home country. Very few reported incidents of theft.

The remittances are used for three principal purposes. In order of frequency and importance are food and groceries, then school fees and then medical costs.

All interviewees were convinced of the importance of their remittances to their families back home and were of the view that without them the family would not be able to achieve as much (particularly at school or in education), or in extreme cases fall into far deeper poverty. It was significant to note too that interviewees would often borrow money to send back home at times of crisis and then spend quite some time paying back the debt at very high interest rates in South Africa. The small amount and infrequency of remittances by those interviewed would suggest that the situation of many households is quite precarious.

**Question 28**

Again a distinction needs to be made between cross-border traders, regular cross-borer workers and migrants who leave home to seek work in South Africa. Amongst the latter category there was no clear pattern. The longest any of the interviews had lived in South Africa was nine years. The shortest period was under a year. The person who had lived in South Africa enjoyed stable job as a nursing aid and seldom returned to Zimbabwe. She had been back just three times since leaving. At the other end of the spectrum, one interviewee went back to Zimbabwe every three months, “I just jump over the border and then I jump back again”. This particular interviewee was highly politically active and this may explain her frequent trips back to Zimbabwe, but she nevertheless retained close linkages.
with her family and friends in Zimbabwe. A plurality of those interviewed regularly return home once a year, but more frequently if the need arises such as a health problem or a domestic or family problem or for a special occasion such as a family member’s birthday or school graduation. Apart from their annual sojourn back home usually at Christmas, we could discern no clear pattern of regular visits back home. This in part is driven by affordability issues, but also due to the risk and ‘hassle factor’ of trying to get across the border particularly for the undocumented migrants.

**Question 31**

With the exception of the interviewee who had lived in South Africa for nine years, had a regular job and had little family left in Zimbabwe, none of the interviewees intended staying in South Africa indefinitely. Cross-border trading is now a way of life for some and they are successful at it. For others, regular cross-border employment is also a way of life that did not necessitate them being away from their families for any extended period. For those who had migrated to South Africa to seek work and live, the experience was often traumatic and unhappy. However, very few interviewees viewed South Africa as a stepping stone to migration overseas such as to the United Kingdom or the United States. Furthermore, relatively few of the interviewees were professionally qualified and ‘globally mobile’ and thus the sample may represent a class/educational bias if not a gender bias.

By way of contrast, SAIIA recently advertised for the positions of Deputy Programme Head, Economist and Sustainable Development Research all requiring a PhD or Masters Degree qualification. Four out of six shortlisted candidates for the Deputy Programme Head were Zimbabweans. Three more Zimbabweans submitted excellent CVs from the UK and Germany.